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PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES BEYOND CONSENT:
RETHINKING CONTRACT THEORY
Leon E. Trakman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article argues for a vital new pathway to the regulation of
contracts in American law. It proposes a theory of public responsibility
to safeguard public values that are unprotected by the reciprocal consent
of private parties to contract. Challenging the conception of contracts-asproperty-rights, it posits that such responsibilities are necessary to
redress public harm that is ordinarily not protected by the exchange of
contractual promises. If contract law is to support social justice, it ought
to surpass restrictive conceptions of equity that focus wholly on
corrective injustice between contracting parties at the expense of public
deterrence. If contract regulation is to promote the public good, it ought
to transcend limiting theories of consent that reduce public
responsibilities to imperfect obligations that are binding in morality, but
not in law.
II.

CORRELATIVE RIGHTS AND DUTIES

The continuing problem with correlative rights talk1 lies in the
tendency to preserve rights as the overriding manifestation of individual
liberty in private law, not least of all in relation to the liberty to
contract.2 At issue is the deontological liberal proposition 3 that
* B.Com., LL.B., (Cape Town); LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard); Professor of Law and former
Dean, School of Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney. This Article was conceived in a
contract theory seminar co-taught at the Wisconsin Law School with Stewart Macaulay and the late
John Kidwell in 1993, and developed further since then in seminars at Harvard, U.C. Davis, and
UNSW. Particular thanks are owed to Lenny Andreev and Bryan Druzin for their comments, Kendy
Ding for her editorial assistance, and the Australian Research Council for a grant and sabbatical to
write it. This Article is dedicated to the memory of John Kidwell.
1. See W. L. Summers, Legal Rights Against Drainageof Oil and Gas, 18 TEX. L. REV. 27,
32 (1939) (explaining in the context of gas and oil that correlative rights limit the privileges of
adjoining landowners through right-duty relations that preclude such landowners from both causing
injury to, and taking an undue proportion of, the common source of supply).
2. P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 586-89 (1979); Roscoe
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correlative rights and duties inhering in the individual transcend
communal, including moral, values, which otherwise might justify the
regulation of contracts in the public interest. 4 In contention is the
argument that public responsibilities beyond individual rights are
defensible and indeed warranted, due to this limitation in private
contract rights.5
This Article considers the judicial dilemma in determining whether,
when, and to what extent to transcend the correlative nature of private
and individuated rights and duties, such as in extending public
responsibilities for contracts beyond the ambit of the individual's
consent to contract.6 It explores the judicial reluctance to invoke
normative values to impose responsibilities on parties. 7 Using contract
law illustrations, it challenges these three propositions: first, that
contract law excludes public responsibilities as being morally and not
legally determined; second, that private rights give rise only to private
duties; and third, that violations of public responsibilities, whether or not
redressed by public law, are external to contract remedies. 8 It argues
instead that public responsibilities should necessarily be embodied in
contract law to protect important moral and social interests that are
otherwise unprotected by contract rights, and in respect of which other
private and public law remedies may be absent or limited in their scope

Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 455-57, 461-62,478-79 (1909).
3. On deontological liberalism, see LEON TRAKMAN & SEAN GATIEN, RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 48, 53, 61-63, 74-75 (1999).

4. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld identified four kinds of correlative (and opposing) jural
relations. This Article focuses on only two of his jural correlatives-rights and duties. Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE
L.J. 710, 741-45 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Legal Conceptions 1917]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-33
(1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Legal Conceptions 1913]; see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE
RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF
CONTRACT LAW 62 (Aleksander Peczenik & Frederick Schauer eds., 1997); Robert A. Hillman,

Essay, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REv. 103, 106-07 (1988).
5. On the legal as distinct from the moral boundaries of rights, see Jules Coleman,
Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the PracticalDifference Thesis, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT:
ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPTOFLAw 99, 112-14 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001); Scott
J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE

CONCEPT OF LAW, supra, at 149, 149-53; Matthew Kramer, How Moral PrinciplesCan Enter into
the Law, 6 LEGAL THEORY 83, 99-107 (2000); and Matthew H. Kramer, Throwing Light on the Role
of Moral Principlesin the Law: FurtherReflections, 8 LEGAL THEORY 115, 131-35 (2002).
6. On the conception of public reason in how we ought to stand in relation to one another as
citizens within a liberal democracy, see JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: WITH THE IDEA OF
PUBLICREASON REVISITED 54-58, 78-85 (1999).
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Parts VI-VIII.
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and application.9 It proposes moving beyond conceptual fictions by
which consent is imputed to the parties; and, it focuses instead on
achieving social-moral ends, including public order, beyond the artificial
construction of party consent.10 It maintains further that a law of contract
that remains imbedded in correlative rights and duties associated with
the reciprocal promises of contracting parties will impoverish the very
conception of contractual duties that it purports to protect.1" That
impoverishment is most evident when contractual duties are excluded on
grounds that they are not formally proportionate to contractual rights, or
because they improperly address public interests beyond the immediate
rights of contracting parties. The purpose of a public responsibility is to
protect public interests that are not commensurate with the correlative
rights and duties of contracting parties but warrant legal protection
because of their overriding communal value.
In addressing these issues, this Article focuses on the inherent
tension between libertarian idealism, reflected in the autonomy of the
individual from government constraint, and the social welfare state that
purports to promote equality in contracting.12 Typifying this tension is
the long-standing assertion that contracts embody rights to property in
the liberal state in which individuals freely exchange goods and services
including by contract, even when the contract is intended wholly to
protect the interests of a dominant party, as was upheld in the recent,
divided U.S. Supreme Court decision of DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia.1
On the other side are attempts to ameliorate the perceived economic and
social impact of individual autonomy upon communal interests, notably
14
with the rise of the post-welfare state.
9. On public responsibilities beyond correlative or jural rights, see TRAKMAN & GATIEN,
supra note 3 and infra Part VIII.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW
26, 43, 73-76 (1983); Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1651, 1664-66
(2009); Leon E. Trakman, A Plural Account of the TransnationalLaw Merchant, 2 TRANSNAT'L
LEGAL THEORY 309, 309-27 (2011); Leon E. Trakman, The Twenty-First-Century Law Merchant,
48 AM. Bus. L.J. 775, 800-03 (2011).
13. 136 S. Ct. 463, 466-68, 471 (2015) (preempting California law that barred a contractual
waiver of class-wide consumer arbitration actions). On a rights-based theory of contracting,
identified with contracts-as-private-property, see Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract,
103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 31-46 (2009) and see also Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089,

1100-01, 1105-09 (1972).
14. This sentiment is reflected in Justice Ginsburg's dissent in DIRECTV Inc., 136 S. Ct. at
473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[A]rbitration is a matter of 'consent, not coercion."' (quoting Stolt-

Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010))). On the amelioration of the
sanctity of contract in the welfare state, see generally Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare
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In recognizing community interests beyond contractual rights,
public responsibilities can protect normative values that are unprotected
by reciprocal promises in contract, that produce unfair and publicly
deleterious consequences, and that are not shielded by private law
remedies arising in contract, tort, or unjust enrichment.
The conceptual rigidity of correlative rights and duties is nowhere
more evident than in the readiness of common law courts to decline to
enforce promises to negotiate in good faith, as it insists on an artificial
separation between obligations grounded in morality and legal duties
grounded in consent.15 Let us assume a hypothetical conflict between
Mal and Bonum. Bonum alleges that Mal has breached his promise to
negotiate a contract in good faith. Under a correlative conception of
rights and duties, Mal's promise does not give rise to a duty to negotiate
in good faith because it does not promise to produce a certain result,
namely, a binding main contract between Mal and Bonum. In effect,
6
Bonum has no right to impose a duty on Mal to negotiate in good faith.'
The functional result is that Mal can flaunt the narrow ambit of Bonum's
rights, knowing that common law courts are unlikely to treat Mal's
promise to negotiate as per se binding. 7
This Article argues instead for imposing a responsibility on Mal to
negotiate in good faith even though Bonum lacks a legal right to impose
a legal duty on Mal. 8 The purpose is to hold Mal responsible for his
unfair treatment of Bonum in negotiating because Mal would otherwise
not be subject to a duty in contract to negotiate in good faith on grounds
that he has not promised to produce a certain result, namely, a negotiated
contract.19 Imposing a responsibility on Bonum also ensures that he has
State: A Defense of the UnconscionabilityDoctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the
Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995).
15. For a criticism of the reluctance of common law courts, particularly in England, to enforce
agreements to negotiate in good faith, see Leon E. Trakman & Kunal Sharma, The Binding Force of
Agreements to Negotiate in GoodFaith,73 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 598, 600-06 (2014).
16. See id at 603-04 (distinguishing between "morally irksome and legally condemnable
negotiating conduct"). On the proposition that the moral basis of a contract is determined by the
consent of the parties to exercise rights and assume duties, see Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,272 (1986).
17. On the duty of good faith primarily in relation to performance, as distinct from good faith
in contracting, see Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.); Teri
J. Dobbins, Losing Faith: Extractingthe Implied Covenant of Good Faithfrom (Some) Contracts,
84 OR. L. REV. 227, 255-57 (2005); E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The
Duty of Best Efforts in ContractLaw, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 8, 15-17 (1984); and Emily M.S. Houh,
CriticalInterventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in
ContractLaw, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1025, 1034-36 (2003).
18. See infra Part 111.
19. See ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, THE CONCEPT OF GOOD FAITH IN AMERICAN LAW 2-3
(1993); Paul MacMahon, Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal Norm, 99
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a legal remedy against Mal beyond the narrow conceptual boundaries of
certainty in contract law.2 °
However, in advancing a theory of public responsibilities, this
Article also focuses on the value of imposing public requirements on
parties like Mal on moral grounds that, arguably, are justifiably
embodied in the law.2 1 It challenges the public-private law divide by
which the protection of a public interest in Bonum's fair treatment is
excluded as not being commensurate with his private rights. 2 The
purpose is to demonstrate that Mal ought to be legally responsible both
for failing to negotiate in good faith in relation to Bonum, and in light of
the social reprobation of his action. At issue, therefore, is not only the
inequitable treatment suffered by Bonum as a result of Mal's bad faith,
but redressing the public interest in discouraging Mal's negotiating
conduct, explicated through the injustice to Bonum. The rationale for
courts injecting plural standards of fairness into contracts 23 is reinforced
by structural bargaining inequalities between parties like Mal and
Bonum. The purpose of a public responsibility is to remedy those
disparities in the absence of, or in addition to, statutory or common
law remedies.24
The further purpose is to transcend a restrictive theory of
contractual consent based on the correlative promises of Mal and Bonum
that fails to recognize the moral foundations of legally binding
promises.25 Imposing a public responsibility beyond a consensual duty
aims to avoid the fiction that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes sought to
normalize in stating, "nothing is more certain than that parties may be
MINN.L. REv. 2051, 2057-58, 2064-65 (2015); Trakman & Sharma, supranote 15, at 613-14, 627.
20. See Trakman & Sharma, supranote 15, at 624-26.
21. See infra Part VI. The conception of liability for failing to fulfill a responsibility is
significantly better developed in moral theory than in law. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Rights and
Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract, in R.G. FREY & CHRISTOPHER W. MORRIS, LIABILITY
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN LAW AND MORALS 135, 165 (1991).

22.

For arguments on the artificiality of the public-private divide, see Morton J. Horwitz,

Comment, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1423-25 (1982)
and Duncan Kennedy, Comment, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U.

PA. L. REv. 1349, 1351-52 (1982). On a challenge to the public-private divide in contract law in
particular, see Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1010-11, 1014-15, 1024 (1985).

23.

See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 85-92 (N.J. 1960).

24. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of ContractLaw: The Objective Theory of
Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1263, 1270-71, 1303-06, 1310-12 (1993); Andrew

Phang, Doctrineand Fairnessin the Law of Contract,29 LEGAL STuD.534, 549, 560-61 (2009).
25. On the morality of promising, see Charles Fried, Response, The Convergence of Contract
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REv. F. 1, 3 (2007). But cf Randy E. Barnett, ContractIs Not Promise;

Contract Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 647, 654-57, 662-64 (2012) (arguing for a consent
rather than a promise theory of contracting); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L.
REv. 553, 571-78 (1933) (criticizing both will and promissory theories of contract).
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bound by a contract to things which neither of them intended, and when
one does not know of the other's assent., 26 Contrary to Holmes's
proposition, this Article advocates for a less fabricated and more
contextual conception of a responsibility than reliance on the fictional
intention of the parties. It argues instead for imposing standards of
good faith in negotiating that are publicly sustainable, without having to
hypothecate Mal's and Bonum's intentions, which neither likely
expressed and Mal would emphatically deny having made. 8
Imposing a responsibility on Mal does not displace the correlative
relationship between the legal rights and duties of Mal and Bonum in
entering into, performing, and terminating a contract.2 9 What this Article
advocates is that a party like Mal be held legally responsible to
collaborate with Bonum in accordance with public standards of
accountability that are grounded in social morality and, which not only
take account of, but transcend Bonum's legal rights and Mal's
correlative duties. 3' Even Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who drew a
distinction between law and morality 130 years ago, elaborated: "I do
not say that there is not a wider point of view from which the distinction31
between law and morals becomes of secondary or no importance.
Arguably, imposing a legal responsibility on Mal to negotiate in good
correlative to Bonum's rights,
faith, operating beyond his legal duties
32
embodies that "wider point of view.
Part III of this Article evaluates the limitations associated with
correlative legal rights.33 Part IV proposes that legal responsibilities
transcend the required commensurability between rights and duties of
contracting parties that give rise to correlative, and reciprocal,
promises.34 Part V illustrates the limits of correlative promises in
contract law.35 Part VI advocates for moral determinism to inform the
nature and operation of legal responsibilities that would otherwise be
26. 0. W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10HARv. L. REv. 457,463 (1897).
27. See Leon E. Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 58 BUFF. L. REv. 1031, 1039, 1041,
1043 (2010).
28. Leon E. Trakman, Frustrated Contracts and Legal Fictions, 46 MOD. L. REv. 39, 42

(1983); Trakman, supra note 27, at 1043, 1082-85.
29. On such correlative rights and duties, see Hohfeld, Legal Conceptions 1913, supranote 4,
at 31-33.
30. On theories of regulation beyond contractual consent, see HILLMAN, supra note 4, at 15255 and Hillman, supra note 4, at 119-20.
31. Holmes, supranote 26, at 459.
32. Id On the tension between liberty and equality in seeking this "wider point of view," see
ISAIAH BERLIN, HistoricalInevitability, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 41, 91-97 (1969).

33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part V.
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excluded from the analytical construction of correlative rights and duties
in contracting.3 6 Part VII challenges the division between private
property rights and public responsibilities arising from the nature and
use of contracts.3 7 Part VIII illustrates how legal responsibilities can
redress the tension between contract liberalization and contract
regulation.3 8 Part IX discusses the distinction between efficiency and
moral determinism in delineating the nature and operation of
responsibilities.39 Part X evaluates the law governing commercial
impracticability, first, in terms of correlative rights and duties, and
second, in accordance with a conception of responsibility.4"
III.

THE LIMITATIONS

OF CORRELATIVE RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Public responsibilities redress the limitation in consent theories of
contracting that insist on an artificial separation between obligations
grounded in morality and legal duties grounded in consent.4' If Bonum
has no correlative right to enforce Mal's promise to negotiate in good
faith, Bonum has no legal remedy. The normative basis for Mal's
responsibility arises because Bonum's correlative rights are deficient in
failing to protect important social, economic, and moral interests that are
not fully or adequately protected by Bonum's legal rights, in respect of
which Mal has no correlative legal duties. The basis for imposing public
responsibilities lies in the insufficiency of reciprocal rights and duties in
contract to redress socioeconomic and moral interests, that include but
extend beyond the interests of the immediate parties to that contract, and
that are not adequately protected either statutorily or judicially, including
in equity.42

36.

See infra Part VI.

37. See infra Part Vl.
38. See infra Part VIII.
39. See infra Part IX.
40. See infra Part X.
41. On the morality underlying the consent of the parties to exercise rights and assume duties
by contract, see Barnett, supra note 16, at 297-300. On the Fuller-Hart debate on the separation
between law and morality, see Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 638-43 (1958); H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594-95, 597-601, 605-06, 608, 616-17 (1958); RONALD
DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14, 19-22, 29-30, 41-44 (1977);
David Lefkowitz, The Sources of InternationalLaw: Some Philosophical Reflections, in THE

PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 196-99 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010);
and Scott J. Shapiro, The "Hart-Dworkin'"Debate: A Short Guidefor the Perplexed, in RONALD

DWORKIN 22, 31-35, 49-50 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
42. On deficiencies in consumer contract legislation, see Chris Willett, Direct Producer
Liability, in MODERNISING AND HARMONISING CONSUMER CONTRACT LAW 189, 199-202 (Geraint
Howells & Reiner Schulze eds., 2009).
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Such responsibilities are not restricted to particular kinds of
relationships involving structural bargaining inequalities between the
parties, such as responsibilities to negotiate in good faith with mass
consumers or employees.4 3 Nor, too, are these responsibilities
necessarily limited to remedial action. They are proactive in seeking to
prevent harm as much as they are reactive in responding to such harm.
As such, responsibilities include affirmative obligations, such as for the
producer of perishable goods to cooperate, consult, guide, or even
caution purchasers in averting risks of accelerated product deterioration
of which they are unaware and which are not dealt with expressly by
contract, or are inadequately regulated by statute or the common law due
to the novelty of the goods and limited regulation of the sector, or both.
Mal's failure to act affirmatively includes failing to explain the risks
associated with use of the product, or doing so in a substantially
insufficient manner."
The justification for responsibilities being proactive in seeking to
prevent future harm is not without justification in moral theory, if not in
law. In particular, a foundational principle in socially responsible
investing is to give "heightened attention" to risks of human rights abuse
in industries in which correlative legal duties are absent or deficient.45
Noteworthy, too, is the fact that corporate responsibility to respect
human rights exists independently of the ability and willingness of states
to fulfill their own human rights obligations.46
However, public responsibilities are not directed only at redressing
substantive inqualities borne by a defined class of persons, such as
consumers, but derive from the heightened consciousness of the need to
prevent and redress social harm arising from the risk of rights abuses,
such as environmental health risks that are not adequately protected as
legal rights. 47 The primary purpose of such a responsibility is to both
redress and discourage public harm, subject to the remedy being
commensurate with, and not disproportionate to, that harm.4 Such a
43. See MARTiN HEVIA, REASONABLENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY: A THEORY OF CONTRACT
LAW 53-55 (2013) (discussing the relational duties of individuals and the importance of
"enforceable cooperation" in the idea of "equal freedom").
44. See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism:A Study in ComparativeLaw,
117 YALE L.J. 340, 367, 369, 399 (2007) (discussing consumer protection and safety legislation).
45. John Ruggie (Special Representative), Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the UnitedNations "Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework, 12, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/3 1, annex (Mar. 21, 2011).
46. On this foundational principle, see id. 11.
47. On the harm theory of contracting, focusing on the prevention of harm, compare STEPHEN
A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 69 (2004).

48. The following is an example of such proportionality. It would be arbitrary to permanently
shut down a factory for emitting potentially harmful environmental waste in respect of which the
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responsibility extends beyond substantive inequalities between defined
classes of persons. As a matter of principle, the determination is whether
a corporate producer was aware of the actual or prospective harm that
eventuated, whether it failed reasonably to inform its purchasers, and
whether that failure was inadequately redressed by equitable rights and
duties arising from statutory and common law.
The purpose of public responsibilities is also not to prevent
producers from limiting their liability, expressly or by reasonable
implication, notably where purchasers are properly informed about
impending risks and demonstrate informed consent to assume the risk
of ensuing harm. Such responsibilities do not jettison exemption
or limitiation of liability clauses.49 Rather, they subject them to
public standards of accountability, not unlike the responsibility that
both governments and citizens bear for the conduct of full, free, and
fair elections.5 °
The nature of public responsibilities is therefore influenced not only
by disparities in structural bargaining power between the parties, as well
as not only by the capacity of one party to exploit the limited knowledge
of the other in a wanton and dissolute manner. The purpose of a
responsibility is to respond to an actual or impending public harm, such
as a drug manufacturer's failure to advise unknowing purchasers of
novel risks associated with the product at issue. That purpose is not to
seek formal or quantitatively proportionate remedies between the
manufacturer's act and its public effect. The purpose is rather to apply a
remedy that is qualitatively commensurate to the act giving rise to the
public harm without exceeding the normative need for it.
The imposition of such a responsibility does not deny that a drug
manufacturer like Mal might well offer purchasers like Bonum extended
warranties to redress such risks of harm. What it does deny is that Mal is
absolved from legal responsibility as of right in the absence of warranty
protection on grounds that Mal has no duty in the absence of Bonum
having a correlative legal right.
factory was compliant with pre-existing environmental regulations: the factory was not reasonably
aware of the nature of that potential harm, the impact on factory employees would be
disproportionate to the benefit of the factory being closed, the harm to employees could be
redressed, and future harm could be minimized. On deterrence damages, see, for example, Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74
IOWA L. REv. 115, 153-61 (1988) and Craig Rotherham, Deterrence as a Justificationfor Awarding
Accounts of Profits,32 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 541-42 (2012).
49. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 316-19 (1982).
50. On a theory of public responsibility extending beyond private law rights, see Leon E.
Trakman, Public Responsibilities for Electoral Fraud Beyond Correlative Rights and Duties,
UTRECHT J. INT'L & EUR. L., 14 Aug. 2015, at 17, 23-25.
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Comparable reasoning applies to responsibilities arising from
workplace agreements. Illustrating the responsibilities of employers over
workplace safety are two related employer responsibilities: that
employers do not obfuscate workplace safety measures, such as by
"negotiating" to omit them from workplace agreements; and that courts
apply remedies qualitatively commensurate with standards of public
safety, and quantitatively commensurate with the losses sustained by
individual employees due to employer non-compliance with those
standards. The guiding premise is that the employer's failure to exercise
such responsibilities undermines the effectiveness of, and confidence in,
employment safety, not only as a private but also as a public concern. 5
The application of that responsibility depends on the nature of the
employer's conduct giving rise to public harm, such as failing to redress
systemic workplace bullying and promoting a culture of compliance in
which dissonance is suppressed. 2 The extent of that responsibility, in
turn, depends on the viability of alternative legal remedies, such as the
reluctance of regulators to impose legal duties on employers on grounds
that regulatory costs outweigh the social and economic benefits.53
Accordingly, the basis for imputing public responsibilities to
contractual dealings is conceptual, functional, and contextual. The
conceptual purpose of public responsibilities is to avoid attenuating a
conception of mutual consent that shields employers from public
accountability, including from accounting to employees.54 The
functional purpose of public responsibilities is to supplement restrictive
conceptions of correlative promises, without displacing them, by taking
into account workplace hazards, such as exposing employees to physical
and environmental harm that employment contracts fail to protect
51. See, e.g., F. M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE
HARM 244-48 (2007) (criticizing Joseph Raz's conception of rights and duties). On the scope for
developing social rights, see JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS 41-57 (2012) and David Beetham,
What Futurefor Economic and Social Rights?, 43 POL. STUD. 41, 44-50 (1995).
52. On responsibilities for workplace bullying, see Kara A. Arnold et al., Interpersonal
Targets and Types of Workplace Aggression as a Function of PerpetratorSex, 23 EMP. RESP. &

RTS. J. 163, 167-69 (2011) and Margaret H. Vickers, Towards Reducing the Harm: Workplace
Bullying as Workplace Corruption-A CriticalReview, 26 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 95, 97-99 (2014).
53. On these propositions, see ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED
WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA'S CITIES 39,

50, 52-54 (2009), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf

and

PER SKEDINGER, EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION: EVOLUTION, EFFECTS, WINNERS AND

LOSERS 57-65, 118 (Laura A. Wideburg trans., 2010).
54. On the need for freedom of contract to protect property rights as distinguished from
human rights, see SYLVESTER PETRO, LABOR POLICY OF THE FREE SOCIETY 40-42, 48, 52 (1957)
and see also RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

65-67 (1998), which maintains that the freedom to exchange property depends on the knowledge of
those involved in the exchange.
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against and that are insufficiently protected by employment legislation.55
The purpose of responsibilities for workplace safety is also contextual in
taking account of the employment context, such as the preponderance of
vulnerable women, minorities, 5 6 and elderly employees in the sector, and
evidence of contractual clauses that exclude employer liability for
workplace safety57 or that deny fiduciary duties arising from the failure
58
of corporate officers to advise employees about workplace hazards.
The protection of responsibilities is directed not only at protecting
the private interests of employees, but also at promoting the public
interest in employee welfare.5 9 The presupposition is that public
remedies are not invariably available, as when legislation fails to provide
adequate workplace protections for reasons varying from political inertia
to the previously unknown or unreported nature of the private and public
harm. By imposing responsibilities beyond promises as rights giving rise
to legal duties, courts can identify, investigate, and redress actual or
prospective abuses of agreements that are otherwise unprotected by
contract rights, or for that matter tort law, restitution, or the criminal
justice system. 6' They can protect public standards of workplace safety,
beyond the equitable limits placed on promissory estoppel and
detrimental reliance. 6 1 They can award punitive damages beyond
55. On responsibilities, beyond correlative legal duties, for environmental damage, see
TRAKMAN & GATIEN, supranote 3, at 59, 65-69, 254-70.
56. On gender stereotyping in employment and family contracts and conflicts, see Julie C.
Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and WorkFamily Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54-68 (2010). On gender and racial discrimination, see
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245-46, 1248-52 (1991). On the absence of
consent or contract as the embodiment of slavery, see generally ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL,
WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY (1991).

57.

See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 44, 51-52 (2004);

James W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: PhilosophicalPerspectives on Its Scope
and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 281, 285-87 (1993); Kathleen Segerson, An Assessment of
Legal Liability as a Market-Based Instrument, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TwENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 250, 262-66 (Jody Freeman &
Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007).
58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. On the reluctance of securities commissions in
multiple jurisdictions to reformulate rules governing the duties of auditors in the wake of corporate

collapses, such as Enron, see Leon E. Trakman & Jason Trainor, The Rights and Responsibilities of
Auditors to Third Parties:A Callfor a PrincipledApproach, 31 QUEEN'S L.J. 148, 180-92 (2005).
59. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1665-66, 1671-73 (discussing the intersection of private
behavior and social welfare); Posner, supra note 14, at 285, 298-301, 316-17 (discussing the
mechanism of welfare through both a private and public lens).
60. On the interface between freedom of contract and the law of torts and restitution, see
generally FRANCIS ROSE, BLACKSTONE'S STATUTES ON CONTRACT, TORT AND RESTITUTION (27th
ed. 2016).
61.

On the moral basis of promissory estoppel, see Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of

Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 292-96 (1996). But see JONATHAN MORGAN,
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compensation on public policy grounds directed at deterring unfair
contracting through tort remedies that supplement contract liability.62
Importantly, they can also impose responsibilities, varying from
injunctions to judicial supervision of the workplace, to protect against
workplace harassment that is inadequately protected by legal rights.63
Importantly, too, courts can recognize that a private law theory of
contracts that focuses predominantly on the rights of individuals, such as
those that arise from an employment contract, is deficient in failing to
recognize a social good beyond contracts-as-property-rights. 64 Typifying
the social good beyond private contract rights are intergenerational
interests, such as preserving the environment for future generations that
are insufficiently protected by correlative rights and duties.6 5
Responsibilities that result in remedies extending beyond those
prescribed by contract law do not speak for themselves but must be
substantiated in fact. For example, the responsibility of employers to
redress workplace stress arising from supervisors using racial epithets is
contingent on whether employee interests in not being victimized by
racist taunts are inadequately protected by employer duties and whether
employees sustain material harm arising from that conduct.66
Requiring an employer to redress such employee interests in the
absence of effective contractual remedies extends beyond the costs and
benefits of compensating employees to include deterrent and retributive

CONTRACT LAW MiNIMALISM: A FORMALIST RESTATEMENT OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW 4-

16(2014).
62. The assumption is that an "efficient breach" is entirely compensatory, although it is
arguable that including a punitive element in damages may be efficient in fact. Cf U.S. Naval Inst.
v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 936 F.2d 692, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1991). For a comparative analysis of
efficient breach, see generally Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No "Efficient Breach" in the Civil Law?:
A ComparativeAssessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract,55 AM. J. COMP. L. 721
(2007).
63. See discussion supra Part I; see also TRAKMAN & GATIEN, supra note 3, at 26-28, 39-41
(arguing between the priority of the "right over the good" and a "plurality of values" in a social
context in which the state and the community "help to determine the nature ofjustice").
64. On deontological liberalism, see supranote 3 and accompanying text.
65. On generational responsibilities for the environment beyond correlative rights and duties,
see Brian Barry, Sustainability and IntergenerationalJustice, in FAIRNESS AND FUTURITY: ESSAYS
ON ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 93, 106-13 (Andrew Dobson ed.,
1999); INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., SCI. & ENvTL. HEALTH NETWORK,
AN ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS: MODEL STATE CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS AND MODEL STATUTE 4 (2008), which provides that "[t]he current regulatory system
falls short of completely protecting the interests or rights of future generations"; and Alison Dundes
Renteln, Relativism and the Searchfor Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56, 66-68 (1988),
which discusses the way in which cultural relativism is compatible with cross-cultural universals,
due to its focus on enculturation rather than tolerance.
66. See TRAKMAN & GATIEN, supranote 3, at 109-10.
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liability. 67 For example, responsibilities arise when regulators consider
ex ante that the cost of regulation exceeds its social benefit, such as by
treating the cost of a constitutional challenge for violating freedom of
expression under the Fourteenth Amendment as outweighing the benefit
of regulating racist speech in the workplace-but ex post evidence
demonstrates a deficiency in that ex ante cost-benefit analysis.68
However, responsibilities are neither wholly fixated on offsetting
market dominance by aberrant employees or producers nor focused
solely on providing remedies to employees and consumers in mass
employment and consumer markets. Certainly, public responsibilities
take into account structural bargaining disparities, such as Mal's
capacity to subordinate Bonum by virtue of class, race, gender, and age,
in negotiating an employment contract. However, Mal's responsibility
extends further to the manner in which Mal failed to advise Bonum
about product risks, the public harm that ensued, and the insufficiency of
legal rights-not limited to Bonum's rights-to redress that harm.
So, too, what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander.
Just as employers have duties and, arguably, also responsibilities to
regulate workplace safety in renegotiating employment contracts,
employees have responsibilities, such as in responsibly redressing the
alleged failure of employers to adopt workplace safety measures through
responsible workplace demands and reasonable use of grievance
procedures. 69 No person or authority ought to have absolute rights or
powers that can be exercised irresponsibly without both moral and legal
consequence. 70 Insofar as rights bestow powers on entities or persons
over other persons, as a parent has powers over a child, an employer
has over employees, and a government has over citizens, it is arguable
that all are subject to responsibilities, however minimal, on account of
that bestowal.71
Imposing a responsibility on a negotiating party does not idealize
the distribution of justice, such as between parties to employment

67. See, e.g., Kostritsky, supranote 48, at 123-35; Rotherham, supranote 48, at 541-44.
68. See Leon E. Trakman, Transforming Free Speech: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 OHIO
ST. L.J. 899, 909-11, 908 n.55 (1995).
69. On employee responsibilities, see, for example, Michael T. Zugelder et al., Balancing
Civil Rights with Safety at Work: Workplace Violence and the ADA, 12 EMP. RESPONSIBILITIES &
RTS. J. 93, 102 (2000). On the history of this tension between employee rights and contract duties,
see, for example, ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY 39-47 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2001).
70. On responsibilities as rational bases for moral-legal obligations, see JOHN FINNIS,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS: VOLUME IV, at 141 (2011).
71. For an analysis on the limits of legal power as authority for social order, see IREDELL
JENKINS, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF LAW: A THEORETICAL ESSAY 371 -75 (2014) (ebook).
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contracts, nor does it seek a perfectly just, efficient, or Pareto optimal
outcome.72 However, it does decry the subordination by rank or status of
the Kantian "person" as a moral being.73 As such, responsibilities are
conceived primarily substantively, as safeguards against the misuse of
contract promises as rights.7 4 They are also conceived procedurally, as
embodying a Rawlsian notion of procedural fairness by which persons
with limited bargaining capacity to negotiate are accorded procedural
fairness, such as to file a grievance against an employer without fear of
reprisal. 75 Those procedural rights are directed at ensuring that the
consent of employees to contract is not unfairly imposed and that
the terms of agreements concluded are procedurally-not only
substantively-fair. As such, public responsibilities are directed at
promoting a fair process of contract bargaining and redressing social
harm arising from the failure of that process. 76 By requiring the exercise
of responsibilities beyond legal duties arising from promises as rights,
courts can avoid hypothecating the intention of the parties. 77 They can
identify, investigate, and prosecute abuses of the bargaining process that
are otherwise unprotected by contract rights, or for that matter by the
law of torts, restitution, and the criminal justice system. 7t Conversely,
72. According to Coleman, "Economists as well as proponents of the economic analysis of
law employ at least four efficiency-related notions, including: (1) Productive efficiency, (2) Pareto
optimality, (3) Pareto superiority, and (4) Kaldor-Hicks efficiency." Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509, 512 (1980).
73.

On the Kantian "person," see CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 55 (1997).

74. On such substantive inequality in contract law, see CAROLE PATEMAN & CHARLES W.
MILLS, CONTRACT AND DOMINATION 20 (2007) (discussing the impact of property rights to
perpetuate domination in contracting).
75. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83-88 (1971). On Rawlsian principles of contract
law, see HEVIA, supra note 43, at 122-26.
76. See, e.g., Kent Greenfeld, Corporate Law and the Rhetoric of Choice, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS: TOWARD SOCIAL JUSTICE 61, 78-82 (Dana L. Gold ed., 2009) (indicating that choice
and consent are two tools that can be used to balance bargaining power); cf Anthony T. Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 774-75 (1983) (demonstrating the
rationale for restricting contractual powers); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism,84 VA. L.
REv. 229, 267-71 (1998) (illustrating the paternalistic view of forfeiture clauses in credit sales).
77.

See RICHARD AUSTEN-BAKER, IMPLIED TERMS IN ENGLISH CONTRACT LAW 144 (2011)

(discussing the imposition of duties based on the relationship between the parties); Hugh Collins,
Implied Terms: The Foundationin Good Faithand FairDealing, 67 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 297,
299-304 (2014) (reconciling the settled practice of judges imposing default rules on contracts with
obligations that "had to be discovered in the... will of the parties"). But cf George M. Cohen,
Implied Terms andInterpretation in Contract Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:
THE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS 78, 82-90 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)
(analyzing the presumed intent of parties whose contract is incomplete); Trakman, supranote 28, at
39-53 (challenging implied terms giving rise to excuses from performance, as hypothecations of
intention and ultimately, as legal fictions).
78. On the interface between freedom of contract and the law of torts and restitution, see
generally FRANCIS ROSE, supra note 60 and Linda Curtis, Note, Damage Measurementsfor Bad
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while responsibilities transcend the strict sanctity of correlative rights
and duties, they do not exclude legal duties arising in tort, restitution,
and criminal law.79
Finally and importantly, one can argue that the existing structure of
legal rights and duties provides adequate legal protection, whether
through a constitution, such as in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; legislation and administrative regulations; or
the common law.8" However, such laws may give rise, at most, to
imperfect obligations, binding in morality and not in law. 8' A particular
case for public responsibilities arises, inter alia, in relation to contracts in
emerging areas of law, such as agreements relating to environmental
protection, surrogacy interests in the fetus, and the unrequited interests
of indigenous peoples not limited to land claims.82 Public responsibilities
seek, inter alia, to protect material interests that are otherwise
underprotected or unprotected by law for not being correlative to any
countervailing right, and which would produce material loss or harm in
the absence of such responsibilities.
IV.

REQUIRING PROMISES TO BE COMMENSURABLE

Correlative rights and duties are based on the assumption that legal
duties are owed only if they are commensurate in both kind and degree
with legal rights.83 For example, the judicial language of contracting is
FaithBreach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 161,163-85 (1986).
79. Id.; see Cohen, supra note 25, at 578-80 (arguing that reliance-based theories of consent
are overstated); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondenceof Contractand Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1603, 1613-16, 1631-32 (2009).
80. On the nature of the application of the Equal Protection Clause to corporations, see Santa
Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1886) and see also PAUL BREST ET AL.,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 241-42 (4th ed. 2000),
which outlines the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment; BREEN CREIGHTON & ANDREW
STEWART, LABOUR LAW §§ 2.53-.54, at 40-41 (5th ed. 2010), which notes how an Australian statute
"called upon the corporations power" in its constitution to "permit the negotiation of 'enterprise
flexibility agreements' between incorporated employers and groups of employees"; ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 251-54 (Henry Steele
Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1st ed. 1988), which discusses the historical circumstances of
the drafting and passing of the Fourteenth Amendment; and SKEDINGER, supra note 53, at 69-73,
which examines employment protection litigation in both common and civil law systems.
81. The conception of "imperfect obligations" as moral obligations giving rise, at most, to
weak legal rights, is ascribed to John S. Mill and Jeremy Bentham. See P.J. KELLY,
UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE CIVIL LAW 67-68

(1990); John Rawls, Justice as Reciprocity, in JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM WITH CRITICAL
ESSAYS 242,255 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 1971).
82. On a comprehensive treatment of each of these issues, see TRAKMAN & GATIEN, supra
note 3, at 138, 182-87, 217-25.
83. On the concept of commensurability, and its distinction from incommensurability, see,
for example, MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 149-55 (1990); David
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framed in light of correlative promises which, in being commensurable,
give rise to mutual consent.8 4 This commensurability occurs in discrete
transactions at the moment of mutual consent when the parties are ad
idem-of the same mind. 5 So, too, in relational contracts in which there
are multiple moments of consent over the course of a contractual
relationship, the presupposition is still that the promises of the parties are
commensurate in kind and degree at each stage of their relationship,
expressed through their mutual exchange of correlative promises.8 6
As an illustration, Mal has a duty to compensate Bonum for breach
of a contract promise that leads to damages that are commensurate with
Bonum's rights. These damages may conceivably extend beyond
reliance damages when Mal is estopped from denying a pre-contractual
representation giving rise to expectation damages.8 " However, such
damages remain compensatory in nature and therefore also remain
commensurate with Bonum's rights.8 8 As a result, Mal has no
responsibility beyond his duty to compensate.
Nor have courts, in general, ventured substantially beyond the
conceptual boundaries of rights and duties in imposing responsibilities
on contracting parties. Significantly, the objective theory of contracting
relies on a fictionalized account of the conceptual framework of
contractual rights and duties to redress a defect or deficiency in a
person's consent, rather than impute external standards of fairness into
contractual relationships.8 9 For example, the judicial assumption is that
employer-Mal has an imp6rfect and therefore unenforceable legal duty

Wiggins, Incommensurability:FourProposals,in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND
PRACTICAL REASON 52, 52-56 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); and BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 76-80 (1981).
84. AUSTEN-BAKER, supranote 77, at 22.
85. See Janet O'Sullivan, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 231, 231-33 (1997) (reviewing F.D. ROSE,
CONSENSUS AD IDEM: ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN HONOUR OF GUENTER TREITEL

(1996)). For a challenge to "consensus ad idem" in so-called "nonbargained contracts," see Joshua
A.T. Fairfield, The Search Interest in Contract, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1237, 1260-64 (2007) and
Lawrence Solan et al., Essay, False Consensus Bias in ContractInterpretation,108 COLUM. L. REV.
1268, 1271-73 (2008).
86. On relational contracts, see infra note 197.
87. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel,
ContractFormalities,and Misrepresentations,15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443,483 n.192 (1987).
88. Id. at 478-79; see also Koch Hydrocarbon Co. v. MDU Res. Grp., Inc., 988 F.2d 1529,
1541-43, 1548 (8th Cir. 1993); Lickley v. Max Herbold, Inc., 984 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Idaho 1999).
89. In subscribing to an objective measure of consent, Randy Bamett emphasizes the
difficulty in ascertaining the subjective state of mind of the parties. But, he does not see anything
contradictory between his conception of objective consent and consent as a subjective measure of
agreement. See Barnett, supra note 16, at 305-10. On the subjective and objective conceptions of
contract, see Boudewijn Sirks, Change of Paradigmin Contractus, in NOVA RATIONE: CHANGE OF
PARADIGMS IN ROMAN LAW 133, 136-45 (Boudewijn Sirks ed., 2014).
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to negotiate in good faith due, inter alia, to an inferred vice or defect in
consent, namely in failing to promise to conclude the main contract.9"
Alternatively, courts impute a legal duty to Mal to respect a
promise to negotiate in good faith with Bonum, in effect imputing
consent to Mal to be bound contractually based on party practice or trade
usage." The operative fiction is that the court carries out the will of Mal
and Bonum by objective imputation, such as by analogy to other
employer-employee relationships.92
At their most adventurous, judges fill gaps in incomplete
contracts; 93 redress perceived inequities between parties like Mal and
Bonum, including on grounds of economic efficiency;94 and arrive at
remedies beyond the literal or plain word meaning of the text. 95 Judges
using creative methods of interpretation along contextual lines can
conceivably redress material interests not ordinarily protected by rights,
such as Bonum's interest in binding Mal to pre-contractual statements
that do not promise to lead to a binding contract. However, such
contractual remedies are resisted conceptually, such as on grounds that
Mal's promise is uncertain in nature, making the case for legal

90. See Trakman & Sharma, supranote 15, at 615-17.
91. On a strict construction, the court could conclude that parties who freely conclude
contracts are legally "bound by their pacts," namely pacta sunt servanda. On the ancient origins of
this concept, see Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897 and see also Hans Wehberg, Pacta
Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775, 775-79 (1959).
92. At issue, again, is the will theory of contracting. See F.H. BUCKLEY, JUST EXCHANGE: A
THEORY OF CONTRACT 15 (2005); Anthony T. Kronman, A New Championfor the Will Theory, 91
YALE L.J. 404, 420-21 (1981) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981)).
93. On the merits of a new criterion for default rules in incomplete contracts, namely "filling
gaps" in contracts with terms that are favorable to the party with the greater bargaining power, see
Omri Ben-Shahar, Essay, A BargainingPower Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396,
420-23, 426 (2009). For new formalists who challenge judicial gap-filling by realist courts, see Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1783, 1784 & n.66, 1785-86 (1996) and Symposium,
FormalismRevisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999).
94. For the argument that judicial gap-filling may be efficient including in contracting, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41-49 (1973). But see Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87, 98, 119 (1989); Omri Ben-Shahar, "Agreeing to Disagree": Filling Gaps in Deliberately
Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WiS. L. REV. 389, 400, 407-09 (2004). For evidence that sophisticated
parties often may prefer a default rule that strictly enforces their contracts rather than "delegate"
authority to courts to fill gaps on equitable or other grounds, see Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Design and the Structure of ContractualIntent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1046, 1048,
1051-52 (2009).
95. On the literal interpretation of contracts, see, for example, Steven Shavell, On the Writing
and the Interpretationof Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289,298-300 (2006).
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all
responsibilities to protect otherwise under-protected public interests 96
legislation.
enabling
of
absence
the
in
particularly
the more justifiable,
A key problem in excluding moral duties on grounds that they are
quantitatively incommensurate with legal rights is the exclusion of legal
responsibility for moral outrage at breach.97 In effect, "efficient breach"
prevails over "fault in breach." 98 The guiding tenet of faultless breach is,
"let us not blame the contract breaker."99 However morally or socially
deleterious Mal's breach may be, Mal has a duty only to compensate
Bonum contractually through restitution, reliance, or expectation
damages, 10 0 and not to assume further compensatory or punitive
liability for public harm for ensuing losses.101 Bonum, in turn, is entitled
only to damages that are commensurate with Mal's breach, beyond
nominal damages. 102
Certainly, courts can modify the language of correlative promises
to accommodate conceptions of willfulness or negligence directed at
public care and safety. 10 3 For example, they can adopt tort-like
conceptions of negligence, such as to deter Mal from using negligent
misstatements to induce employees like Bonum to contract. 10 4 However,
in borrowing from the language of correlative rights and duties in tort
96. See Trakman & Sharma, supra note 15, at 624-27.
97. On the debate over whether moral values are inseparable from efficiency values, see
Richard A. Posner, Reply, The Problematicsof Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1637,
1653-54, 1660, 1662, 1668-70 (1998), which argues that moral values are encompassed in
efficiency values, and comapre Ellis Washington, Reply, The Inseparability of Law and Morality, 3
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1,

19-20, 47, 52, 133 (2002).

98. On efficient breach in common law contracts, see Scalise, supranote 62, at 724-27.
99. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Foreword, Fault in American Contract Law, 107
MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1344-45 (2009); Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a ContractBreaker,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1350, 1356-58 (2009). But cf TONY HONORE, RESPONSIBILITY AND

FAULT 70-76 (1999) (justifying tort liability as corrective justice).
100. On reliance damages, see L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54-55, 71-75, 89-92 (1936). But cf Richard Craswell,
Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 99, 126, 144-51 (2000) (arguing that reliance
damages are subsumed by expectation measures); Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest
in ContractDamages, 1992 WIs. L. REv. 1755, 1783-85 (1992) (characterizing reliance damages as
an academic exercise). On expectation interest, see David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest
in ContractDamages, 48 EMORY L.J. 1137, 1146-50 (1999).
101. See, e.g., U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 936 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1991)
(arguing against the award of punitive damages in contract law, and arguing for compensatory
damages based on the theory of "efficient breach").
102. On nominal damages for breach of contract, see Acheson v. W. Union Tel. Co., 31 P. 583,
583 (Cal. 1892) (per curiam).
103. See Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, Willfulness Versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based
Defense of Willful Breach Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1517, 1529-30 (2009).
104. On the interface between liability for negligent misstatement in contract, as distinct from
tort, see Mark P. Gergen, Negligent Misrepresentationas Contract, 101 CALIF. L. REv. 953, 9991001 (2013).
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law, this judicial approach is conceptually strained, even though it is
functionally justified.I° 5
Equally apposite, courts can construe Mal's and Bonum's
correlative rights and duties in light of canons of construction to redress
structural inequalities in their bargaining capacities. For example, they
can interpret the contract contra proferentem, namely against the
drafter-in this case, Mal.1" 6 They can also hold that Bonum's consent is
subject to a vise under the law of undue influence, 10 7 physical or
economic duress, 10 8 or unconscionability.1 °9 Again, the judicial
reasoning is conceptual, in relying on the contract doctrine to prevail
over strict compliance with consent in contracting.
Finally, a court can address the incommensurability in the remedies
derived from Bonum's rights and Mal's duties in contract, by
reconstituting Bonum's damages for pain and suffering in contract into
damages in tort. 1 0 In so doing, it can accommodate a higher threshold of
liability that reflects a public standard of moral outrage at Mal's
default.1 1 Similarly, the court can award Bonum damages exceeding
Mal's unjustified enrichment under the law of restitution, or it can order
the disgorgement of Mal's profits.1 12
105. Nevertheless, the conception of fault in contracting arguably has a place in common law
contracts. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability,
Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1413, 1418-19 (2009); Robert A. Hillman, The Future of Fault in ContractLaw, 52 DUQ. L. REV.
275, 284-89 (2014); Barry Nicholas, Fault and Breach of Contract, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN
CONTRACT LAW 337, 345 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); Stephen A. Smith,
Performance,Punishment and the Nature of ContractualObligation, 60 MOD. L. REV. 360, 373-76
(1997).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
107. Id. § 177(1).
108. See Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political"and "Economic"
Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 153-54, 156 (1935).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 132-36. On procedural unconscionability, see Arthur
Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485,
489-508 (1967).
110. See, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 642-44 (N.H. 1929) (denying damages for pain
and suffering in a contractual claim against a doctor who promised that surgery would fully repair
the plaintiffs hand, which was injured during an electrical wiring accident).
111. On binding promises underpinning the philosophy associated with contract law, see W.
DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT

LAW 20-21 (1996) and Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising,88 MICH. L. REV. 489,491-503 (1989).
112. On the commensurability between unjust enrichment and compensation, see, for example,
Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 973 N.E.2d 743, 746-47 (N.Y. 2012). But see Peter Birks, Annual
Miegunyah Lecture: Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 1, 4-7, 15-20
(1999) (discussing the discontinuity between the law of unjust enrichment and the law of restitution,
as between the law of equity and the common law). On the disgorgement of profits, see DAVID
WINTERTON, MONEY AWARDS IN CONTRACT LAW 133-216 (2015).
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The problem, yet again, is that the decision remains imbedded in a
right-duty correlation that excludes public morality, unless that morality
is legally recognized a priori, such as through laws rendering contracts
unenforceable for offending good morals-namely, for being contra
bonos mores." 3 Part V illustrates the limitations of relying on fictional
imputations of party intention under a correlative rights and duties
contractual regime.114
V.

AN ILLUSTRATION: LIMITATIONS IN CORRELATIVE

RIGHTS AND DUTIES

The limitations associated with a rights-based contractual regime
that fails to take adequate account of public interests is best represented
through an illustration of correlative rights and duties in contracting. Let
us commence with an agreement in which material public interest issues,
arguably, do not arise. Assume that Mal offers to sell Bonum a 1910
Ford designed by Henry Ford himself for $10,000,000, which Bonum
accepts. According to a strict application of correlative rights and duties,
Mal has the right to receive $10,000,000 in return for passing title in the
car to Bonum. The result is mutual assent by which Bonum has the right
to the car in return for the duty to pay Mal $10,000,000, while Mal has
the converse rights and duties." 5 Those rights and duties are binding in
law so long as they satisfy other requirements associated with the
formation of a contract: the parties seriously intended to conclude a
exchange, and the
contract, the parties engaged in a bargained-for
11 6
certain.
were
contract
their
of
terms
material
Now, let us add an issue relating to fair dealings between Mal and
Bonum. Assume that Mal had stated, before the sale, that the car was "in
mint condition." After buying the car, Bonum discovers that the engine
113. See Nelson Enonchong, Effects of Illegality:A ComparativeStudy in French and English
Law, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 196, 201-02 (1995); Leon E. Trakman, Commentary, The Effect of
Illegality in the Law of Contract: Suggestions for Reform, 55 REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN
[CAN. B. REV.] 625, 627-28, 632-33 (1977); John W. Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired
Through Illegal Transactions,95 U. PA. L. REV 261, 262-65 (1947).
114. See infra Part V.
115. For a subjective conception of the meeting of the mind signifing mutual assent, see
Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 369 (1921). Contra Spring Lake NC,
LLC v. Holloway, 110 So. 3d 916, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (arguing that there is no attention
given to a party's "mind" in determining whether there was a "meeting of the minds," even when
that party, in seeking to avoid a contract, "could not possibly have understood").
116. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 42, 49-51 (Gregory Klass et al.. eds., 2014); Mindy ChenWishart, A Bird in the Hand: Considerationand Contract Modifications, in CONTRACT FORMATION
AND PARTIES 89, 91 (Andrew Burrows & Edwin Peel eds., 2010); MICHAEL FURMSTON & G.J.
TOLHURST, CONTRACT FORMATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 6,283-84,316 (2010).
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was significantly rebuilt in the 1940s using the original parts from other
1910 models insofar as they were available and substitute parts insofar
as the former were not available. He wants the contract to be rescinded
on grounds that Mal, in not indicating that the car was rebuilt in the
1940s, had misrepresented in a material respect that the car was in mint
condition and misled Bonum into buying it. Assume that Mal responds
that he did not know that the car had been rebuilt in the 1940s but that
the material condition of the car was no different to that which he had
promised, namely it is still a 1910 Ford designed by Henry Ford and that
it was in mint condition when he so represented its condition.
Did Mal engage in a pre-contractual misrepresentation about the
condition of the car? If Mal's statement that the car is in mint condition
is a mere opinion upon which Bonum is not expected reasonably to rely,
Mal may not be bound. However, if the court concludes that Mal is an
expert in classic cars upon whose opinion Bonum is likely to rely, and
that the car was not in mint condition associated with its original
condition, it may order rescission of the contract.117 The potential
arguments a court might invoke in deciding are multi-fold. If it decides
to construe the contract strictly in accordance with a classical will theory
of consent, it would conclude that there is a contract.1 18 Mal promised to
sell Bonum a specific car at a particular price-and Bonum agreed.
There were no express conditions attached to their respective promises.
Therefore, there was consensus ad idem. Mal has a right to receive
$10,000,000 in return for the car; and Bonum has a duty to pay that sum
in order to acquire ownership of it. In effect, the court finds no objective
reason to vary from the will theory in which the contractual rights and
duties of Mal and Bonum are determined subjectively.1 19
Alternatively, the court might conclude, using a subjective theory
of contracting, that Bonum had the right to rescind the contract on
grounds that Mal intended to induce and, conceivably, deceive Bonum
into buying the car; that Mal had concealed his awareness that the car
had been reconditioned; that such reconditioning was material; and that
Bonum was induced and, conceivably, deceived into buying it.12
117. See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906, 908-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 168 cmt. d, illus. 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
118. See Trakman, supranote 27, at 1038 & n.24.
119. On the classical wills theory of contracting, see BUCKLEY, supra note 92, at 27-34 and
Cohen, supranote 25, at 575, which provides, "[a]ccording to the classical view, the law of contract
gives expression to and protects the will of the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy
of respect."
120. On misrepresentation by concealment, see, for example, Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130,
131-32 (Dist. Ct. App. 1983), which involved failure to disclose that the house was the scene of
multiple murders, and Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674, 676 (App. Div. 1991), which
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If the court rejects this subjective construction of Mal's and
Bonum's intentions to contract, there are various objective arguments
upon which it can base its decision. Among them, it can imply a term
into the contract that the car should satisfy particular conditions of sale,
including both originality and authenticity. 121 It may imply these
conditions of sale on grounds that reasonable parties in the position of
Mal and Bonum would have agreed to them had they been aware of
them at the time of contracting. This determination is conjectural. Unless
Mal or Bonum knew about the condition of the car at that time, it is
unlikely that either contemplated that eventuality in fact.
The court might attempt to make its conjectures less fictional by,
for example, admitting evidence of a trade usage that regulates the
physical condition of a classic car offered for sale. 22 However, the court
may again engage in conjecture about the nature and effect of that usage
(if it exists at all). It may also conjecture about such usage's
applicability, given that neither party had expressly agreed to adopt that
usage, and Bonum, as a one-time buyer, may have lacked knowledge
about it.
The court could conjecture further that, had a reasonable person in
Bonum's position been aware of the car's condition at the time of
purchase, that person would not have wanted to buy the car, or would
have wanted to buy it at a lower price. This ex post facto construction of
intention is contrived because the reasonable person in Bonum's position
is the court itself, imputing23 an intention to Bonum based on its
reconstruction of the bargain. 1
Similar reasoning arguably would apply to other objective
constructions of consent, which the court could adopt in determining
whether to enforce the contract. 124 For example, the court could hold
that a reasonable person would have concluded that Mal had
involved failure to disclose that the house was "haunted."
121. See AUSTEN-BAKER, supra note 77, at 106-15. On the use of implied terms to hypothecate
the intention of contracting parties ex post facto, see Trakman, supranote 28, at 41.
122. See, e.g., AUSTEN-BAKER, supranote 77, at 80.
123. On the shift from the subjective to an objective theory of contracting, see Joseph M.
Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69
FORDHAM L. REv. 427, 444-46 (2000) and see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981); AUSTEN-BAKER, supra note 77, at 22; FARNSWORTH, supra note 49,
§ 3.6, at 114; Ian R. Macneil, Commentary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts andPresentation, 60
VA. L. REV. ANN. INDEX 589, 592-93 (1974); and Williston, supranote 115, at 369.
124. On the objective test, see, for example, Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 521 (Va. 1954)
("We must look to the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than to his
secret and unexpressed intention. The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the
reasonable meaning of his words and acts." (quoting First Nat'l Exch. Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke
Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 (Va. 1937))).
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misrepresented, expressly or impliedly, the condition of the car with
the intention of inducing Bonum to contract, and that a reasonable
person in Bonum's position would have relied on that misrepresentation
to his detriment.1 25 Conversely, that court could conclude that a
reasonable person in Bonum's position would not reasonably have relied
on Mal's representation, but should have resorted instead to a prepurchase inspection. 126
In each scenario immediately above, the court uses the conceptual
language of rights and duties to determine whether or not to enforce the
contract. For example, it could conclude that Mal had a correlative duty
to disclose the condition of the car based on a reasonable imputation of a
misrepresentation to him about which he was silent but upon which
Bonum could reasonably have relied. 127 It could hold the opposite: that
Mal has no such duty to disclose based on the opposite inference drawn
from his silence. The result is that the analytical foundation of
correlative rights and duties arising from mutual promises remains
intact; what changes are the reasonable inferences, which the court
draws ex post facto from Mal's silence and imputes to each party.
These ex post facto judicial constructions of the correlative
promises of the parties also determine their remedies. If the court holds
that an objective person would conclude that Mal had expressed an
opinion about the condition of the car, the court might decide that there
was no misrepresentation in fact. The court might conclude differently,
that Mal had innocently misrepresented the condition and require Mal
to return any money received from Bonum, such as a down payment
on the car, as restitution. 128 The court might determine that Mal's
misrepresentation was grossly negligent or fraudulent, Bonum
reasonably relied on the misrepresentation, and thereby order rescission
29
of the contract and require Mal to pay further damages to Bonum. 1
The essential method of imputing an objective intention to Mal and
Bonum is by the court framing reasonableness in moral terms, which it
125. A material misrepresentation is one which "would be likely to induce a reasonable person
to manifest his assent" or that "the maker knows... would be likely to induce the recipient to do
so." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2).
126. See, e.g., id. § 163 ("If a misrepresetation as to the character or essential terms of a
proposed contract induces conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by one who neither
knows nor has reasonable opportunity to know of the character or essential terms of the proposed
contract, his conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.").
127. See, e.g., Estate of Timko v. Oral Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n, 215 N.W.2d 750, 752
(Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
128. On innocent misrepresentation, see, for example, Lesher v. Strid, 996 P.2d 988, 993 (Or.
Ct. App. 2000).
129. On fraudulent misrepresentation, see, for example, Kirkham v. Smith, 23 P.3d 10, 13
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
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then reconceptualizes in terms of correlative rights and duties. For
example, it infers from Mal's silence that a person in Mal's position
ought reasonably to have known about the condition of the car and was
under a reasonable duty to investigate and disclose that condition; 130 and,
that a person in Bonum's position ought reasonably to have the right to
rely on Mal to disclose the condition of the car. Each judicial inference
depends on two distinct presuppositions grounded in the prioritized
language of rights and duties: that Mal had the primary duty to disclose
the condition of the car or that Bonum had the primary duty to inquire
about that condition.13 1 Despite the moral nature of the language used,
the reasoning is ultimately conceptual, in that it resides in the primacy
accorded to Mal's and Bonum's correlative rights and duties.
This primacy of correlative rights and duties is also evident, albeit
less apparently, in the judicial application of contract doctrines, such as
unconscionability, which seek to redress substantive inequalities in
contracting. For example, assume that Mal deals in classic cars and
Bonum is a neophyte who had never before purchased a classic car. Mal
is aware of Bonum's lack of such knowledge. Under a subjective will
theory of contracting, Bonum's right not to be treated unconscionably is
correlatively related to Mal's duty not to act unconscionably.132 In
shifting to an objective theory of contracting, the court is likely to draw
reasonable inferences about Mal and Bonum, including Mal's
knowledge and expertise about classic Ford cars and Bonum's lack of
expertise, Mal's awareness about Bonum's limited knowledge and
expertise, Mal's unconscionable conduct in describing the car as being
in mint condition when he knew that the engine had been reconditioned,
as well as the likelihood that Bonum was not so aware and likely
persuaded by Mal's words in buying the car.'
However, the same objective inferences arise when the court
hypothecates that Mal had or had not misrepresented the condition of the
130. On silence as acceptance, see, for example, Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 33 N.E. 495,
495 (Mass. 1893) ("[I]f skins are sent to the defendant, and it sees fit, whether it has agreed to take
them or not, to lie back, and to say nothing, having reason to suppose that the man who has sent
them believes that it is taking them, since it says nothing about it, then, if it fails to notify, the jury
would be warranted in finding for the plaintiff.").
131. On the nature of this duty, see, for example, Ikeda v. Curtis, 261 P.2d 684, 691 (Wash.
1953) (finding misrepresentation in the sale of a hotel in not disclosing income derived from the
rent of rooms as a brothel).
132. See Leff, supra note 109, at 538-39; cf Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:A Critical
Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 301-05 (1975).
133. On the rationale for such judicial scrutiny on grounds of unconscionability, see, for
example, Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 350-54 (Ct. App. 2007). But see
Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for
U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 37-41 (1981).
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car to Bonum. The fact that Mal is a car dealer does not necessarily
imply that Mal was aware that the engine had been reconditioned, and
even so, stating that it was in mint condition in pre-contractual
negotiations does not infer that such statements were unconscionable in
fact. 13 4 Bonum, in turn, may be a neophyte in buying a classic car, but if
Bonum has $10,000,000 to indulge his fancy, he might presumably have
the car inspected prior to purchase, which presumably would identify its
reconditioned engine.
Conversely, the court could conclude, using an objective test, that
Mal's statement about the condition of the car fell short of
unconscionability in not being substantively unfair and also was not
procedurally unconscionable in not being expressed in a complex fine
print clause excluding Mal's liability.135 The court could also conclude
that the incommensurable knowledge of the parties about classic cars
was insufficient to ground an unconscionability claim, that Bonum
could have had the car independently inspected prior to purchase,
and that Bonum could have sought legal advice prior to making so costly
13 6
a purchase.
The problem is that the court's objective determination in each case
is based on the selective imputation of an intention to Mal and Bonum,
as distinct from their per se intentions. The criteria to determine their
correlative rights and duties, again, depends upon the judicial imputation
of their reasonable conduct. These are based on such factors as the
incommensurability of Mal's and Bonum's relative knowledge and
bargaining ability, and objective evidence that Mal was reasonably able
to use superior knowledge and experience to take unfair advantage of
Bonum. It could conclude, based on a reasonable person standard, that
Mal intended to take unfair advantage of Bonum and that Bonum was
unreasonably disadvantaged in fact. Alternatively, the court could decide
to the contrary. However, the underlying basis for its decision resides in
an objective theory of contracting, namely, in protecting the right of a
reasonable person in Bonum's position to receive the car in mint

134. See Hillman, supranote 133, at 11-15.
135. On procedural unconscionability, see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in which the court recognizes unconscionability to include "an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party," and see also Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d
396, 398-99 (N.D. Tex. 2009), in which the court finds an arbitration provision to be illusory.
136. See, e.g., Gatton, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 352 (explaining that for the purposes of rendering a
contract provision procedurally unconscionable, "[o]ppression arises from an inequality of
bargaining power that results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice." (quoting
Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381 (Ct. App. 2001))).
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condition, correlated to the duty of a reasonable person in Mal's position
not to violate Bonum's right. 137
The court, again, resorts to an objective test based on agreement
between Mal and Bonum, construed in light of statutory and common
law. For example, a court can conclude, based on a reasonable person
standard, that an exclusion or limitation of liability clause in a contract
between Mal and Bonum is substantively unfair and procedurally
unconscionable.' 3 8 It can invoke the common law doctrines of duress or
undue influence to nullify that contract, 139 or the statutory and common
to determine that Mal's treatment of
law governing unconscionability,
1 40
unfair.
objectively
Bonum is
The problem is that the law of unconscionability, which has
contractual fairness as its central objective, has a limited scope of
application. Take the case of Mal and Bonum in which some attributes
of unconscionable contracts are lacking. Substantive unconscionability
may be difficult to establish if Mal did not exert undue influence on
Bonum or subject him to economic duress. 4 ' A key attribute of
procedural unconscionability, such as a fine print limitation of liability
clause in favor of Mal, is also likely lacking in the absence of a detailed
written contract. 142 So, too, legislation governing unconscionability,
which applies most readily in mass consumer and employment markets,
is less likely to be available, given that Mal and Bonum are not engaged
in highly regulated economic sectors.' 43 In summary, if legislated and
common law principles of fairness, such as under the law of
unconscionability, fail to regulate dealings between Mal and Bonum
137. On the objective theory of contracting, see Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of
Contracts: The ReasonablePerson Standardand the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293,
295-97 (1997); Perillo, supranote 123, at 430-35, 444-45; and Trakman, supra note 27, at 1043-44.
138. For divergent views on unconscionability in contract, see, for example, Epstein, supra
note 132, at 301-15; David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 394-400
(2012); and Leff, supra note 109, at 543-46.
139. Undue influence is determined by a variety of factors, including "the unfairness of the
resulting bargain, the unavailability of independent advice, and the susceptibility of the person
persuaded." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also
Hale, supra note 108, at 149-50.
140. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to
Standard-FormContracts,43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2014).
141. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability,70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1255-56, 1273 (2003).
142. Id. at 1256, 1271-72.
143. See MINDY CHEN-WISHART, CONTRACT LAW 432-34 (5th ed. 2015) (outlining the
regulation of standard form contracts); Korobkin, supra note 141, at 1247-49, 1254-55, 1284, 128789 (arguing that the efficient use of standard form contracts, including greater use of mandatory
contract terms and judicial modification of the unconscionability doctrine, will better respond to the
primary cause of contractual inefficiency).
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adequately, the case for subjecting Mal to responsibilities on public
interest grounds grows. If the ability to negotiate fair contracts is to
serve as a determinant of conscionable social and economic ordering, it
is entirely fitting to transcend analytical constructions of correlative
rights and duties that fail to serve those ends adequately.144 If consentbased theories of contracting are deficient in their nature or application,
public responsibilities are justified, not only in moral determinism but
also in law. If moral determinism underlying responsibilities is reflected
in social policy, it must surely find a place in legal policy as well. 145
VI.

MORAL DETERMINISM AND

LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Common law scholars are not lacking in moral theories that
recognize contract responsibilities beyond correlative rights and duties.
These vary from returning contract law to its natural law roots, 146 to
efforts by legal realists to transcend formalism in regulating contracts,
including on moral grounds.1 47 Implicit in these legal developments are
both explicit and implicit movements away from the conception of
correlative promises constituted as mutual consent, to the enforcement of
essentially unilateral promises on moral grounds, framed, inter alia, on
grounds of promissory estoppel1 48 or as rectification14 9 of a mistake.15 °
144. For classical commentary on adhesion contracts, see Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of
a Life-Insurance Policy,33 HARV. L. REV. 198,202-10,215, 220-22 (1919).
145. See BUCKLEY, supra note 92, at 51-59; Andrew Robertson, On the DistinctionBetween
Contract and Tort, in The LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: CONNECTIONS AND BOUNDARIES 87, 91, 95
(Andrew Robertson ed., 2004).
146. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
100-01 (2d ed. 2015). For an examination of freedom of contract in natural law and in ethics more
generally, see DAVID G. RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS: A CRITICISM OF SOME POLITICAL AND
ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS 227-31 (Unwin Brothers Limited 1952) (1894).
147. On a blend between legal formalism and legal realism, referred to as "realistic
formalism," see Neil Duxbury, Lord Wright and Innovative Traditionalism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J.
265, 308-09 (2009) and Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2007).
148. See, e.g., Barnett & Becker, supranote 87, at 455-57; Holmes, supranote 26, at 463-64.
149. On formal and substantive grounds underlying rectification, see Paul S. Davies & Janet
O'Sullivan, Rectification, in SNELL'S EQUITY 449, 452-56 (John McGhee ed., 32d ed. 2010);
GERARD MCMEEL, THE CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION,

IMPLICATION, AND

RECTIFICATION 488-92 (2d ed. 2011); and EDWIN PEEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 348-55 (13th ed.
2011).
150. The court could conclude that only Bonum was mistaken. On the other hand, it could
conclude that Mal and Bonum were at cross purposes about the qualities of the car. See, e.g., Raffles
v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 375-76; see also Konic Int'l Corp. v. Spokane Comput.
Servs., Inc., 708 P.2d 932, 935 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (finding a mutual mistake); Sikora v.
Vanderploeg, 212 S.W.3d 277, 286-88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (same). Alternatively, it could
conclude the parties were subject to a common mistake, for example, in both believing that the car
was in a particular condition. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923-24 (Mich. 1887).
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Even the traditional will theory of contracting is sometimes recast into a
moral theory. 1 Moral consideration in the absence of a bargained-for
exchange, in turn, includes promises to keep an offer open, to release a
debt, to modify a duty, and to pay for past benefits or favors. 52
Common law courts have also implicitly recognized responsibilities
beyond correlative promises in construing allegedly unreasonable terms
in contracts expansively, in response to limitations in party consent.153
They have recast, by hypothecation, correlative promises into the
moral rectitude of the court, not least of all in arriving at equitable
remedies in contract.' 54 They have imposed responsibilities directed
at substantive fairness in contracting, such as under section 2-302 of
the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), which regulates substantive
and procedural unconscionability. 1' They have applied responsibilities,
too, in constructing contract terms, notably to regulate boilerplate
56
adhesion contracts. 1
Statutes have also grounded contract responsibilities in moral
values, notably through unfair contracts legislation, which grants wide
judicial discretion to deem certain terms and conditions unfair in
consumer contracts. 5 7 For example, section 2-305 of the UCC expressly
provides that courts can imply terms into contracts of sale, including by
establishing a reasonable market price, which may take account of
158
principles of fairness, beyond narrow conceptions of party consent.

151.

See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 92, at 412-13. But cf JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON:

ON THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ACTION 47-49 (1999).

152. On categories in which judges allegedly uphold contracts in the absence of a bargainedfor exchange, see FRIED, supra note 146, at 30-33. Fried identifies these four categories as not
requiring a bargained-for exchange. Id. at 28.
153. Conversely, courts have reconstituted the objective theory of contracting into the
"subjectivity ofjudgment." See DiMatteo, supra note 137, at 343-53.
154. On judicial gap-filling in contracts, see Avery Wiener Katz, Essay, The Economics of
Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 496, 502, 518, 521, 526
(2004). But see David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1819, 1832, 1867-68 (1991); George M. Cohen, The Fault
That Lies Within Our Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1445, 1457-60 (2009) (arguing for the
qualification of the strict liability view of contract law).
155. On the tensions in the UCC between freedom of contract and fairness between parties, see
Caroline Edwards, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Protection: The
Refusal to Experiment, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 663, 675-79, 689-99 (2004).
156. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS 123-27 (2013); Douglas G.
Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 936-39, 947-50 (2006); Friedrich Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 63742(1943).
157. See Mindy Chen-Wishart, Regulating Unfair Terms, in ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HUGH BEALE 105,

107, 111-13 (Louise Gullifer & Stefan Vogenauer eds., 2014).
158. See U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014).
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Legal scholars, too, recognize the value of moral reasoning in
determining the fidelity to promises.15 9 As Melvin Eisenberg
proclaimed, "[t]he first great question of contract law, therefore, is what
kinds of promises should be enforced.""16 At issue is the nature and
kinds of promises that ought to be protected, whether or not the moral
basis for a responsibility to respect a promise is formally commensurate
with a legal duty protected by a legal right.16 '
The problem is, therefore, not that public responsibilities lack
recognition in contract law, but rather that they are ordinarily excluded
reactively in the absence of a duty and not imposed proactively. If
Bonum's rights do not give rise to a correlative duty owed by Mal, Mal
ordinarily will owe Bonum no responsibility, however deficient Mal's
duty may be when it is considered proactively. 162 If courts embrace a
"contract-as-product" model of contracting, grounded in a mechanized
of consent will
conception of consent, an all-encompassing conception
163
exclude morally informed notions of public harm.
Accordingly, if responsibilities are to overcome restrictive
conceptions of consent, they ought to transcend analytical constructions
of correlative rights and duties. If such responsibilities are to be legally
sustained, they ought to be evaluated systematically, comprehensively,
and proactively-not piecemeal, artificially, and reactively. 164 If they
are accorded public standing, they should redress both Bonum's
equitable interests and the public policy considerations arising from
Mal's bad faith in negotiations. If the effect of that bad faith is
particularly egregious, they should raise the specter of deterrent and

159. See P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 177-79 (1981). But see Barbara H. Fried,
The HolmesianBad Man Flubs His Entrance, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 627, 632-34 (2012).
160. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principlesof Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 640
(1982) (emphasis added).
161. On such commensurability, see supra Part IV and see also T.M. Scanlon, Promises and
Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 86, 99-111 (Peter Benson ed., 2001),
which emphasizes that not every moral responsibility translates into a legally cognizable right.
162. On this close-ended nature of Hohfelt's correlative rights and duties, see, for example,
Layman E. Allen, FormalizingHohfeldian Analysis to Clarify the Multiple Senses of "LegalRight":
A Powerful Lens for the Electronic Age, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 428, 432-36 (1974); Arthur L. Corbin,
Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 164-66 (1919); A.K.W. Halpin, Hohfeld's
Conceptions: From Eight to Two, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 435, 441-45 (1985); and H.J. Randall,
Hohfeldon Jurisprudence,41 L.Q. REV. 86, 89-90 (1925).
163.

See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND

THE RULE OF LAW 99-103 (2013); Arthur Allen Leff, Contractas a Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131,
144-55 (1970); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1125-26 (2000).
164. See R.A. BUCKLEY, ILLEGALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 87-93, 100-04 (3d ed. 2013); M.P.
FURMSTON, LAW OF CONTRACT 449-55 (14th ed. 2001); RICHARD STONE, THE MODERN LAW OF

CONTRACT 16-28 (8th ed. 2009); Trakman, supranote 113, at 651-55.
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retributive damages, beyond compensation in contract, as some legal
scholars recognize.'6 5
Part VII explores the rationale that public responsibilities are
necessary to redress the exploitation of important public interests,
which lack protection as contracts, through a historical U.S. Supreme
166
Court case.
VII.

PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS VERSUS PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES

The debate over the boundaries between private property rights
arising in contract and public responsibilities beyond those private rights
is epitomized in the historical case of Proprietorsof the Charles River
Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1837.167 A key issue in that case was whether the
government of Massachusetts, under the Constitution's Contract Clause,
had breached a charter granting the Charles River Bridge Company the
right to build and operate a private toll bridge when the government
authorized the construction of a new bridge nearby, which was not
subject to a toll until all construction costs had been paid.'68
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, writing for the majority, decided
against the Charles River Bridge Company. 169 He noted that, although
the Constitution prohibited states from violating contracts, nothing in the
grant of the charter to build the Charles River Bridge rendered that
charter exclusive.17 ° Stating that the language of contracts must be
interpreted strictly, or precisely, he concluded that states could regulate
property in the public interest unless the language of a charter explicitly
prohibited it. 7' Otherwise, he explained, no one would invest in new
transportation or new technologies until the old charter had run its
course. 172 He added that economic progress at times required that
165. See KATY BARNETT, ACCOUNTING FOR PROFIT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 25, 53-55 (2012) (arguing that contract damages should take into account deterrence and
retribution); Stephen A. Smith, Performance, Punishment and the Nature of Contractual
Obligation, 60 MOD. L. REv. 360, 370-72 (1997) (evaluating punishment as part of a harm theory of
contract obligations). On punitive damages associated with tort-like breaches of contract, see Leon
E. Trakman, Breach, Compensation and the Magic Carpet, in REMEDIES: ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES 373, 374-76, 393 (Jeffrey Berryman ed., 1991) and Gergen, supra note 104, at 95966. But see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in ContractLaw, 105 MICH. L. REV.
559, 578-81 (2006).
166. See infra Part VII.
167. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
168. Id. at 536-37.
169. Id. at 536-38, 553.
170. Id. at 546-49.
171. Id. at548-49.
172. Id. at 547-48, 552-53.
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existing property rights had to be destroyed to make room for innovation
and improvement.173 Such was the price of progress. 7 4 Justice Taney
further noted: "While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded,
we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that the
happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful
'
He concluded that the social harm of denying such
preservation."175
community rights is that "[w]e shall be... obliged to stand still, until
the claims of the old turnpike corporations shall be satisfied . ,176
Writing for the dissent, Justice Joseph Story argued that the grant to
the Charles River Bridge Company was a public contract protected by
the Constitution's Contract Clause in which Article 1, Section 10 stated:
"No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts .. ,,177 He disagreed with the majority that property rights
were subordinate to the public interest.178 Insisting that the Charles River
Bridge Company had undertaken great economic, political, and
technological risks in building the bridge in the 1780s, he asked this
rhetorical question: "Would any sensible business man.., venture
capital in a risky enterprise... in which the sole profit was the right to
collect tolls, if the legislature reserved the right to destroy those tolls at
any time by chartering an adjacent free bridge?" 179 He answered: "For
my own part, I can conceive of no surer plan to arrest all public
improvements, founded on private capital and enterprise, than to make
the outlay of that capital uncertain, and questionable both as to security,
and as to productiveness."1 8
As the case exemplifies, subjecting contract rights to public
responsibilities ascribed to social, economic, and political interests raises
conflicting choices. On the one side is the judicial activist, but
nevertheless minimalist, view of Justice Story that private contract
rights, by reason of individual autonomy and social utility, should be
81
subject to minimal public responsibilities imposed on contract rights.'
Supporting such minimalism is the resistance to expanding contract
rights beyond their consensual roots, and to not subjugate commercially

173. Id. at 553.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 548.
176. Id. at553.
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1; Proprietorsof the CharlesRiver Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
at 646-47, 650.
178. See Proprietorsof the CharlesRiver Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 615.
179. See id.; Kent Newnyer, Justice Joseph Story, The Charles River Bridge Case and the
Crisis of Republicanism, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 232, 237 (1973).
180. Proprietorsof the CharlesRiver Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 608.
181. On contractual minimalism, see MORGAN, supra note 61, at 89-113.
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driven rights in contracting to a transcendent social contract between
citizens and the state. Justice Story coupled this minimalist view with an
expansive conception of Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution,
prohibiting states from interfering with contract rights. 18 2 In conceptual
terms, no contractual duty ought to be owed to citizens at large, such as
access to affordable travel on public highways, in the absence of them
having an allegedly constitutionally protected correlative legal right or
power giving rise to that duty. Moral entitlement, such as arises from the
public impact of the exercise of contract rights, ought to operate
183
externally to the law of contract.
An ancillary result of this minimalist view is to eschew social
determinants of liability in contracting, as extra-legal, whether they are
expressed as "promissory morality, corrective justice, taxonomic
rationality, or otherwise. 184 In particular, a party should not be morally
judged for declining to perform a contract, so long as that party is
willing to compensate the other party commensurably for the failure
to perform.185
On the other extreme is the literal interpretation, which Chief
Justice Taney adopted in construing the constitutional protection of
contracts restrictively, coupled with an expansive view of the
responsibility of courts to protect against publicly harmful contracting.
Included in this public interest is, for instance, to render travel on
highways more affordable to the public, or conversely to impede the
strict application of private contracts from undermining those public
ends. 186 The perceived social malady stems from the conception that
contracts, however free parties are to enter into them, can have negative
consequences for third parties-here, members of the public at large,
who have no correlative rights giving rise to contractual duties owed to
them. The social policy concern is over the need for public
182. See supra text accompanying note 177. On this tension between private rights-not
limited to contract-- and social rights, see DAVID J.BODENHAMER, OUR RIGHTS 213-22 (2007) and
DAVID HUME, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT 147-55 (Oxford Univ. Press 1948) (1748).

183. On the moral-legal basis of the consent theory in contracting, see Barnett, supra note 16,
at 291-300.
184.
185.

See MORGAN, supra note 61, at i.
On this minimalist approach, see Joshua Cohen, Minimalism About Human Rights: The

Most We Can Hope for?, 12 J.POL. PHIL. 190, 193-202 (2004) and see also CLAUDIO CORRADETTI,
RELATIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A THEORY OF PLURALISTIC UNIVERSALISM 49-53 (2009), which

discusses the theory of absolute metaethical moral relativism, and Maurice Cranston, Human Rights,
Real and Supposed, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43, 49-53 (D.D. Raphael ed.,

1967), which considers human rights as a universal moral right.
186. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 199(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(allowing a party to withdraw from a contract prior to an illegal purpose being carried out to "put an
end to a continuing situation that is contrary to the public interest").
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accountability for the propertied rights of individuals, including the
Charles River Bridge Company, in a context which, according to Chief
Justice Taney, was unrestricted by state regulation.187 In economic terms,
the case raised the disjuncture between the transaction costs arising
from the loss of toll revenue of a contracting party, the Charles River
Bridge Company, and the benefit to the public in not having to pay
those tolls. 88
This tension in judicial reasoning in Proprietors of the Charles
River Bridge is replicated in our post-welfare twenty-first century.
On the one side is the inferred constitutional affirmation of the liberty of
the individual to contract freely and voluntarily189 and to discourage
courts from interfering in the marketplace of contracting. 9 ° This
liberal idealism of freedom of contract, in turn, is transformedfunctionally more than ideologically-into freedom from contract,
directed at limiting the application of contract law in informal noncontractual relations. 191
On the other side is the perceived malady of, inter alia, dominant
parties using one-sided contracts, including contracts sanctioned by
states, to perpetuate de facto servitude, such as toll companies regulating
public transportation, employers dictating employment contracts, and
producers excluding liability in consumer contracts. 192 While the Charles
River Bridge Company did not enjoy a contractual relationship of
187. This concern is most evident in the perceived lack of legal responsibility of corporations
for actions, including contractual, which undermine social, economic, and environmental interests.
See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory ofLegal Responsibility, 111
YALE L.J. 443, 472-75 (2001). See generally DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE
POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005).

188. For commentary on the divided court in Proprietorsof the Charles River Bridge, see
DONALD P. KOMMERS ET AL., AMERICAN
COMPARATIVE NOTES 524-28 (2d ed. 2004).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

ESSAYS, CASES, AND

189. On the sanctity of contract enunciated in the early twentieth century, see, for example,
Pound, supranote 2, at 460 n.35 and Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contractand Social Legislation, 17
COLUM. L. REV. 538, 540-41 (1917); and see also Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract's
Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 116, at 280-84,
which identifies freedom of contract with good faith.
190. On the freedom of the market from governmental intrusion, see 3 F.A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 89-93 (1979) and see also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM

33-34, 50-53 (2003). On the perceived structure of liberty and its application to contract law, see
BARNETT, supranote 54, at 64-67, 65 n.10.
191. On the functional transformation from "freedom of' to "freedom from contract," see
Stewart Macaulay, Freedomfrom Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
777, 777-88 (2004).
192. On the use of adhesion contracts to disempower consumers, see Friedrich Kessler, The
Protectionof the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, Part 1:A ComparativeStudy, 74 YALE L.J.
262, 280-83 (1964).
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dominance over mass commuters, because it had not contracted directly
with commuters at large, it enjoyed a position of de facto market
dominance in being the only bridge crossing prior to the erection of the
Warren Bridge.193
Part VIII, below, illustrates how legal responsibilities can redress
this tension between contract liberalization, such as articulated by Justice
94
Story, and contract regulation as enunciated by Chief Justice Taney.1
VIII.

RESPONSIBILITIES BEYOND CORRELATIVE PROMISES

A theory of responsibility is prefaced on an adaptable conception of
the common good. As such, it responds to competing moral, social, and
economic norms. This unavoidably entertains the contextual assessment
of conceptions of fairness that may affirm, qualify, or supplant the
normative value of contractual efficiency.' 95
A theory of responsibility is, therefore, functional in considering
normative moral and communal values beyond analytical conceptions of
correlative rights and duties.' 96 For example, it takes account of the
nature, kind, and duration of the relationship between the parties. It
recognizes the difficulty in determining ex post facto whether one party
could have averted risks of intervening extraneous events disrupting
performance or whether the other could have mitigated those risks. It
also considers such relational factors as the economic impact of such
disruptions upon the continuity of their relationship, the transaction costs
borne by each in maintaining their mutual dealings, the moral rationale
and economic justification for modifying their performance, and the
extent to which these moral and economic justifications are mutually
reinforcing or contradictory in nature. In essence, moral values inform
responsibilities that support, vary from, or augment correlative rights
and duties that are ascribed to mutual consent.
Finally, a theory of responsibility is capable of sustaining both
discrete transactions and relational contracts, without having to
distinguish between them conceptually through correlative rights
193.
(11 Pet.)
194.
195.

See Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
420, 536-37 (1837).
See infra Part VIII.
On the variable nature of the common good in Aristotelian philosophy, see MARY M.

KEYS, AQUINAS, ARISTOTLE, AND THE PROMISE OF THE COMMON GOOD 29-56 (2006).

196. On functionalism in contract law, see W. Friedmann, ChangingFunctions of Contract in
the Common Law, 9 U. TORONTO L.J. 15, 22-40 (1951) and see also ROGER COTTERRELL, THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 72-73 (2d ed. 1992); W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 76-

77 (5th ed. 1967). But see Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 811-14 (1935); Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 565, 576-78 (1950).
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and duties, or through overreliance on a "single moment" as distinct
from multiple moments of consent.19 7 The nature of responsibilities
may vary according to the kind of discrete transaction or relational
contract in issue.19 8 Their application will depend, inter alia, on the kind
of transactions or relationships in issue; the contractual or other
instruments used; the applicable trade custom, usage, and practice in
issue; and external obstacles to contracting allegedly arising beyond the
control of one or both parties.199 It will also depend on moral-legal
responsibilities imputed to contracting which include but extend beyond
efficient dealings.2 °°
Part IX argues that a conception of economic efficiency may
influence the nature and extent of a public responsibility, but it is an
inquiry that is both distinct from, and subject to, moral determinism.2 '
IX.

EFFICIENCY VERSUS MORAL DETERMINISM

Economic efficiency and social utility may impact the nature of a
responsibility. The seller's exclusion of a warranty may be efficient in
reducing the seller's costs and even in reducing the buyer's purchase
price.20 2 But that exclusion may be morally doubtful if the seller relies
on a fine print exclusion clause that leads to a marginal reduction in
purchase price well below the cost of repairing a defective computer. 20 3
In effect, the moral basis for such a responsibility extends beyond
the cost of the service to the party declining to provide it, and depends
instead on the social effect-not limited to the economic cost to the
197. On the genesis of relational contracts, see IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:
AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 10-20 (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Reflections
on Relational Contract Theory After a Neo-Classical Seminar, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF
CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS 207, 208-09 (David Campbell et
al. eds., 2003); and Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw.
U. L. REv. 877, 881-83 (2000). For a critique of the relational theory of contracts, see Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts,94 NW. U. L. REv. 805, 813-19 (2000).
198. See Trakman, supranote 27, at 1063-65.
199. On these external impediments to relational and network contracts, see, for example,
David Campbell & Hugh Collins, Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contracts, in IMPLICIT
DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS 25, 46-49 (David
Campbell et al. eds., 2003).
200. On the reconciliation between moral rights and economic efficiency in contracting under a
unifying theory of liberty, see Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralismin ContractLaw, 2005 Survey of
Books Relating to the Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1488-98 (2005).
201. SeeinfraPartIX.
202. See Erin Ann O'Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for
Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1883, 1935 (2005).
203. See Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for
(Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 425, 429-30 (2005). But cf R.H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2, 15-19 (1960).
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buyer, and other buyers in comparable situations-of its denial." 4
Accordingly, the producer of a defective product may justifiably be
subject to a lesser duty towards consumers who are charged lower prices
on account of exclusion clauses in boilerplate contracts. But, that
determination is normative, in taking account of the moral-legal effect of
that clause. For example, a producer of an over-the-counter medicine
may well have a legal responsibility to explain the potentially harmful
attributes of a health product to a consumer prior to sale, even if the
"transaction cost" makes doing so economically inefficient, and even in
the absence of formal privity of contract with that consumer. The
normative consideration is whether the consumer is likely to lack such
an understanding, whether the producer is reasonably aware of that lack
of understanding and reasonably able to redress it, and whether the
producer's failure to explain its harmful attributes to the consumer
constitutes a material threat to public health, however incremental that
threat may be.2 °5
The determinative issue for the failure to exercise a responsibility,
therefore, is not whether the exclusion clause is economically efficient,
whether it reduces the producer's transaction costs, or even whether it
reduces the price of the product within mass consumer markets. 0 6 The
determinative issue is whether the exclusion clause violates the
responsibilities of a producer for such actions as knowingly excluding
liability for serious product defects, hiding exclusion clauses amidst a
myriad of otherwise innocuous clauses, or including such clauses in fine
print.20 7 Such determinations of responsibility do not take place in a
legal vacuum, but include consideration of whether consumer protection
legislation and the law of unconscionability regulates such exclusion
clauses and holds producers responsible for the manner in, and extent to
which, they use such exclusion clauses to the economic disadvantage of
specific buyers. If these statutory or common law duties of the producer
are deficient, the case for imposing a responsibility grows stronger.
204.

See JAMEs M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY IN ECONOMIC THEORY 14-15,

19, 24-25 (1969); G.F. Thirlby, The Subjective Theory of Value and Accounting "Cost", in L.S.E.
ESSAYS ON COST 135, 138-41 (J.M. Buchanan & G.F. Thirlby eds., 1973).
205. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 847, 858 (2000) ("If there are to be tradeoffs, why not trade off the chimera of ex ante
certainty in favor of ex post efficiency (or fairness).").
206. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 602-03,607-08, 618 (1990).
207. On the relationship between fine print clauses and transaction costs, see Robert B.
Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1062-66 (2006) and David Gilo &
Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-FormContracts:Strategic Imposition of
Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV.
983, 1021-22 (2006).
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Nevertheless, economic analysis can assist in determining whether
a consumer agreement ought to be legally binding because the consumer
has market choice, even if the terms are one-sided and in favor of the
producer.20 1 itcan do so, for example, by assessing consumer ignorance
and confusion in contracting, 2°9 and by determining the manner in and
extent to which boilerplate contracting can reduce economic waste in
individuated bargaining.210 More generally, economic analysis can also
help to assess when regulating consumer contracts is likely to operate
212
patemalistically;2 11 reinforce a "herd mentality" among consumers;
exacerbate unconscionable dealings; 213 and/or perpetuate a dominant
class system among contractors.2 14 Part X evaluates prospective
remedies arising in relation to commercial impracticability under section
2-615 of the UCC, first, in terms of rights and duties; second, in
accordance with a conception of responsibilities; and, third, by taking
account of conceptions of good faith in terminating or in modifying a
contract on grounds of reasonably unforeseen circumstances.215
X.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY
IN CONTRACT

The final basis for a responsibility lies in its public character. For
example, if Mal fails to supply materials to Bonum under a long-term
208.

See Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 251,

259 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds. 2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner,
One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828-30 (2006);
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the "Opportunity to Read" in ContractLaw, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L.
1, 15-18 (2009).
209. On the "irrelevance" of consumer "confusion," see Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna,
Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 428-29 (2010).
210. But see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, and
the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1661-63 (2008).
211. See, e.g., PtTER CSERNE, FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND PATERNALISM: PROSPECTS AND
LIMITS OF AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 89-93 (2012); Duncan Kennedy, Distributiveand Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 631-33 (1982).
212. On the intuitive formalism of consumers, see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Intuitive Formalism
in Contract, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2109, 2123-26 (2015) and compare Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and
Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 353-59 (1996) and David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C.
Stein, Herd BehaviorandInvestment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 466 (1990).
213. On the economic analysis of unconscionable, contracting, see Korobkin, supra note 141, at
1259-68.
214. See Kennedy, supra note 211, at 616-18. But cf Thomas Brennan et al., Economic Trends
andJudicial Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DuKE L.J. 1191, 1197-1201 (2009).
215. Section 2-615 of the UCC provides for an excuse from performance on grounds of
commercial impracticability. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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supply contract in respect of which Mal is the only supplier, and Mal
claims commercial impracticability, the potential loss is borne not only
by Bonum but by Tertius and Oblitus who depend on Bonum for their
downstream supplies. A key issue in determining whether Mal is
responsible to negotiate with Bonum to provide modified supplies is
whether to take account of the material interests of Tertius and Oblitus,
who do not enjoy rights to privacy of contract with both Mal and
Bonum, and therefore have no contractual remedy against Mal.
The common law of contracts has long recognized that a legal duty
to perform a contract ought to be excused due to changed circumstances
that are unforeseen and beyond the promisor's reasonable control to
avert.216 A conceptual basis of commercial impracticability is that Mal,
who has a duty to perform a contract of supply, is excused from
performance, which extinguishes the right of the other party, Bonum, to
require performance from Mal.217
The first problem with this conception of commercial
impracticability is that it leads to all-or-nothing results, in which one
party, Mal, is excused from performance, imposing the entire loss on
Bonum, or vice versa. 218 The second problem is that it is conceivable
that intermediate remedies ought to apply, such as granting Mal partial
relief from performance based on his degree of foresight and control,
and his economic hardship in having to perform in full as a result of the
intervening event. 219 The third problem relates to whether Mal, faced
with an intervening event that disrupts his long-term relationship with
Bonum, ought to have a duty to negotiate with Bonum in good faith to
maintain modified performance in order to preserve the long-term
relationship. 22° These problems are addressed below.
As a preliminary matter, under a correlative analysis, the basis for
excusing supplier Mal from a duty to perform in relation to Bonum is
that had the parties foreseen the intervening disruption of Mal's
216. See Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 638 P.2d 963, 969-70 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1981).
217. See David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in IAN R.
MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 3, 18-19
(David Campbell ed., 2001); Hugh Beale, Bridging the Gap: A Relational Approach to Contract
Theory, 41 J.L. & SOC'Y 641, 644 (2014); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-Classical,and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L.

REv. 854, 875 (1978); Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristicsand Challenges of Relational
Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 823, 826 (2000).
218. See Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability,and the
Governance of RelationalContracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227,249-50 (2004); infra Part X.A.
219. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfeld, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88-97 (1977); infra Part X.B.
220. See infra Part X.C.
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performance arising from circumstances beyond his control, Mal or
Bonum would not have agreed to contract in the first place. 221 This
hypothecation of Mal's and Bonum's intentions often constitutes no
more than an ex post judicial conjecture. Had Bonum contemplated the
intervening circumstance at the time of contracting, Bonum might still
have entered into the contract, assuming that the risk of its occurrence
was worth taking in light of the greater prospective benefit of
performance. Mal, in turn, may or may not have done the same.
Realistically, as Judge Skelly Wright noted in Transatlantic Financing
Corp. v. United States, "[p]arties to a contract are not always able to
provide for all the possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes
222
because they cannot agree, often simply because they are too busy.
The result is that planning for future risks in long-term relational
contracts is unavoidably speculative.223 It is also difficult and often
disruptive of a relationship for parties to provide explicitly for
future intervening circumstances they do not anticipate, save only as a
224
general possibility.
A.

Winner Take All

Let us now consider the first problem, the all-or-nothing remedy
arising from commercial impracticability, through a traditional analysis
of rights and duties in which Mal promises to supply Bonum with goods
under a long-term supply contract. Applying a traditional approach to
economic impracticability, should Mal not reasonably have foreseen the
ensuing intervening event that arose beyond Mal's reasonable control,
Mal would be wholly excused from performance.22 ' Alternatively, if the
court deems that Mal had reasonably foreseen, or was reasonably able to
control or avert the intervening event, such as by supplying goods from
an alternative source, the court may deny Mal an excuse.22 6 The result is
an all-or-nothing remedy: Mal either receives a total excuse from
performance or, alternatively, no excuse at all. The judicial reasoning

221. Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharingand CommercialImpracticability, 69
MINN. L. REv. 471,476-77 (1985).
222. 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The issue related to commercial impracticability
arising from the closure of the Suez Canal. Id.at 315.
223. See Susan Helper & Rebecca Henderson, Management Practices, Relational Contracts,
and the Decline of GeneralMotors, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2014, at 49, 55, 61-66.
224. Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under
Modern ContractLaw, 1987 DuKE L.J. 1, 5-6 (1987).
225. Trakman, supranote 221, at 474-76.
226. See id at 476-77.
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relies on an ex post facto assessment of what Mal actually knew or
might have or ought to have known at the time of contracting.22 7
The essential problem, in the analysis, is that the court imposes a
duty on Mal on the grounds that Bonum has a right, which the court
itself constructs and then imputes by fiction to the parties. In effect, its
determination is based on an after-the-fact conjecture about Mal's and
Bonum's intentions, particularly in the absence of words or conduct
verifying Mal's and Bonum's actual intentions when contracting. 228 The
court hypothecates and ascribes an intention to them, distinct from their
per se intention. The result-is a protracted objective test grounded in the
conduct of a reasonable person in the position of Mal or Bonum, or both.
itself, as the final arbiter in
That person, inevitably, is the court
229
result.
fair
and
determining the just
B.

Winner Take Some

Let us now consider how a conception of public responsibility can
address the second problem-namely, splitting the loss between Mal and
Bonum based on their long-term relationship, the nature and gravity of
the intervening risk, the prospective economic hardship borne by each
party, and the potential to arrive at an intermediate solution in good
faith, such as modified performance.230
Under a theory of responsibility, the basis of Mal's relief from
performance for commercial impracticability depends on an assessment
of the normative context surrounding the intervening risks of Mal's nonperformance and extends beyond an all-or-nothing excuse or no excuse
from performance granted to Mal.23 1 The result is that the court can take
account of the economic costs and fairness to Mal in reaching a
reasonable remedy that does not place the full burden of the loss arising
from Mal's non-performance only on him, or if Mal is excused from
227.

On the judicial hypothecation of the consent ofthe parties, see id at 477-78.

228. Trakman, supra note 28, at 42.
229. This difficulty to anticipate ex post what the parties actually foresaw and whether they
could have reasonably prevented the intervening event at the time of contracting is well
documented. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 454-55
(E.D. Va. 1981) (involving the failure of a long-term uranium supply contract on grounds of
commercial impracticability under section 2-615 of the UCC); RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, CONTRACTS IN
CRISES: EXCUSE DOCTRINE AND RETROSPECTIVE GOVERNMENT ACTS 7 & n.15 (2007); Paul L.
Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 119, 157-58 (1977). But cf Daniel Markovits, Contractand Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J.
1417, 1433, 1490-91 (2004).

230.

On the importance of context in interpreting relational contracts, see Hugh Beale,

Relational Values in English Contract Law, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF CONTRACT: ESSAYS IN

HONOUR OF IAN MACNEIL 116, 131-33 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2013).
231.

See Trakman, supranote 221, at 488-89.
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performance, only on Bonum.232 This analysis provides for a losssplitting remedy on several grounds. For example, Mal and Bonum
should share losses for reasons beyond whether one or both could
foresee the loss in general but not foresee when the loss would occur,
foresee its gravity, or could have averted it only in part. The
responsibility of Mal and Bonum, arguably, should be shared on grounds
that neither Mal nor Bonum should fairly bear the full burden of
intervening losses, including on grounds that reasonable foresight of the
risk of loss, considered ex post facto, is ordinarily speculative.
The proposition in supporting such a responsibility is, first, that it is
often conjectural whether Mal reasonably foresaw or was reasonably
able to avert the effect of the intervening disruption of supply on Mal's
performance. Second, Mal's partial relief from performance does not
depend on artificially implied terms by which Mal's consent to perform
is vitiated on the dubious ground that Mal, or Bonum, would not have
contracted had either anticipated the changed circumstances.233 Third,
granting Mal partial relief from performance hinges on rational
limitations of a court inferring that which Mal or Bonum might, could,
or would have done had they anticipated the intervening event whose
nature and gravity was not foreseen. Fourth, the rationale for losssharing is that if Mal was not wholly responsible for the effect of the
intervening event, placing the full burden of the ensuing loss on either
Mal or Bonum might not be economically efficient, not least of all in
threatening a long-term supply relationship in the face of often
economically burdensome risks of future losses. 234 Fifth, rather than
speculate about which party should bear the full loss arising from nonperformance based on judicial hypotheses about the knowledge and
ability of each party to foresee and avoid it, the court can adopt a losssharing remedy by which the parties share responsibility for loss as the
court deems just, based on a contextual analysis beyond their spurious
232. For arguments in favor of imputing efficiency values to the non-performance of contracts,
see Sheldon W. Halpem, Application of the Doctrine of CommercialImpracticability:Searchingfor
"The Wisdom of Solomon," 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1123, 1133 & n.42 (1987) and Richard A. Posner,
The Law and Economics of ContractInterpretation,83 TEx. L. REv. 1581, 1584-89 (2005). But see
Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 1551, 1557-62 (2003) (arguing that courts "can be thought of as providing the
supply side of the market" in producing legal rulings).
233. For arguments in favor of implying "fairness" values into contracts in cases of
commercial impracticability, see Trakman, supra note 28, at 42-45.
234. On relational contracts including performance adjustment clauses to address uncertain
future risks and maintain economic efficiency in mutual dealings, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1109-11 (1981); Victor P.
Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
337, 338-43 (1980).
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intentions. Such a loss-sharing analysis may lead to ex post speculation
about the knowledge and control each party had over the intervening
event. However, that speculation is more palpable in arriving at a losssharing formula than insisting on a winner-take-all approach in all
cases. It is noteworthy that a loss-sharing formula is statutorily endorsed
in some British Commonwealth jurisdictions in which courts have
the discretion to split losses between parties arising from frustration of
the contract.23 5
Finally, a court may rely on Mal and Bonum to participate in
determining their responsibilities in arriving at a loss-sharing remedy,
such as by the court appointing a special master to aid the parties to
arrive at a negotiated settlement. 36 In effect, a theory of responsibility
can promote a conception of party-managed responsibility, such as by
requiring the contracting parties to participate in determining their
respective shares of a frustrated loss in complex contracts, as was
adopted by the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia in
FloridaPower andLight Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.237
C. Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith to Modify Performance
The third problem relates to imposing a responsibility on Mal and
Bonum in a long-term relationship, to negotiate in good faith to modify
their performance in light of the disruption in Mal's performance. The
objective of such a negotiation is to limit its harsh economic effects on
their long-term supply relationship. 38
Consider, initially, Mal's responsibility to act in good faith
to preserve a long-term relationship, recognizing the greater cost,
difficulty, or both in Mal performing one or more discrete transactions
within that relationship. 39 Imposing such a responsibility on Mal is
235. But see Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbaim Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd. [1942] AC 32
(HL) 80 (appeal taken from Eng.).
236. Trakman, supranote 221, at 490-91.
237. 517 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Va. 1981). There, the court appointed a special master to assist the
parties in arriving at a negotiated settlement arising from a contract for the supply of uranium, when
the contract became economically impracticable due to supply disruption in the Middle East. Id. at
461-62.
238. See David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual
Relationships: The Role of Co-Operation, 20 J.L. & SOC'Y 166, 168-72 (1993); David Campbell,
Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the "Relational" Contract, 77 MOD. L. REv. 475, 479-80, 482-83,
485 (2014). On modifying or varying a term in a contract, see JOHN CARTWRIGHT, FORMATION AND
VARIATION OF CONTRACTS: THE AGREEMENT, FORMALITIES, CONSIDERATION AND PROMISSORY

ESTOPPEL 336, 345 (2014).
239.

On the virtue of sustaining a long-term relationship, including on organizational economic

grounds, see James M. Malcomson, Relational Incentive Contracts, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL EcoNoMIcS 1014, 1058-59 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2013).
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conceivably subject to certain guidelines. First, Mal's responsibility to
act in good faith is recognized in international instruments, not least of
all in article 7 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods ("CISG"),24 ° to which most countries are
parties, and also in the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts.24 1 Second, Mal's responsibility to perform takes
account of the cost to Mal and its benefit to Bonum. Third, Mal's
responsibility to negotiate to modify performance of a long-term supply
contract conceivably includes a responsibility for Mal and Bonum to
cooperate to sustain a continuing relationship for their mutual benefit,
such as through a network contract. 242 Such a responsibility is distinct
from the availability of a remedy when parties transact discretely in a
competitive market in which each party assumes risks of nonperformance in competition with other buyers and sellers.243
Finally, a public responsibility takes account of the economic and
social effects of a shortfall in Mal's performance, not only on Bonum
240. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 7(1),
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing
art. 7(2). The parties may not exclude or limit this duty. See Larry A.
in international trade. See id.
DiMatteo & Andrd Janssen, Interpretive Methodologies in the Interpretation of the CISG, in
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 79, 95 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014);
JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA 34 (2d ed. 2004); Michael Bridge,

The CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 19 UNIFORM L.
REV. 623, 626-27 (2014); Alexander S. Komarov, Internationality,Uniformity and Observance of
Good Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1), 25 J.L. & COM.
75, 82-85 (2005); Steven D. Walt, The Modest Role of Good Faith in Uniform Sales Law, 33 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 37, 41-49 (2015).
241. INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 1.8, cmt. 1 (2010); see also MICHAEL JOACHIM
BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 94, 127-51 (3d ed. 2005); STEFAN VOGENAUER,
COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS

(PICC) 211-20 (Stefan Vogenauer ed., 2d ed. 2015); Giuditta Cordero Moss, International
ContractsBetween Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-State Law to Be Preferred? The Difficulty
of InterpretingLegal StandardsSuch as Good Faith, 7 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 30-34 (2007).
242.

Hugh Collins,

Introduction to

GUNTHER TEUBNER, NETWORKS

AS CONNECTED

CONTRACTS 11 (Michelle Everson trans., Hugh Collins ed., 2011); Walter W. Powell, Neither
Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, in MARKETS, HIERARCHIES AND
NETWORKS: THE COORDINATION OF SOCIAL LIFE 265, 270-72 (Grahame Thompson et al. eds.,

1991); Richard M. Buxbaum, Is "Network" a Legal Concept?, 149 ZEITSCHRJFT FUR DIE GESAMTE
STAATSWISSENSCHAFT [J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.] 698, 700 (1993) (Ger.); Anna

Grandori & Giuseppe Soda, Inter-Firm Networks: Antecedents, Mechanisms and Forms, 16 ORG.
STUD. 183, 194 (1995).
243. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 59 (1985); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA N.S. 386, 390-92 (1937); Hugh Collins, Competing Norms of ContractualBehaviour,
in CONTRACT AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION: SoCIo-LEGAL INITIATIVES 67, 69, 73, 78-79 (David

Campbell & Peter Vincent-Jones eds., 1996).
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but also on Tertius and Oblitus who depend on Bonum for their supplies
as downstream buyers and who have no control over the risk of Mal not
supplying Bonum. It is in taking account of their material interests, as
parties who do not enjoy the right to privity of contract with Mal, that
Mal's responsibilities to negotiate to continue to supply are most
publicly tested. The issue is not that Mal ought to be infinitely
responsible for the economic consequences of his non-performance on
Tertius and Oblitus. The issue is whether there is a basis for holding Mal
responsible, in law as in morality, for being the direct and proximate
cause of Tertius's and Oblitus's losses arising from Mal knowingly
failing to negotiate. This does not impose a responsibility on Mal when
Tertius and Oblitus foresee the risk of loss and fail to make contingency
plans, such as by identifying alternative sources of supply. Nor ought
Mal's responsibility be to his ruin, such as by requiring him to
substantially perform-notwithstanding a radical increase in supply
costs arising beyond his control. Nor, too, ought Mal be responsible in
the face of a floodgate of crippling downstream claims. Nevertheless,
Mal should conceivably be held responsible for the material interests of
parties like Tertius and Oblitus that are otherwise denied legal protection
on grounds that they are not in privity of contract with Mal. 2"
XI.

CONCLUSION

This Article argues for recognizing public responsibilities beyond
correlative rights and duties in contract in recognition of public-both
social and economic-interests that are not legally protected, on grounds
that they are inchoate, imperfect, or morally rather than legally
informed.24 It illustrates the limitations of correlative rights and duties
that inhere in conventional theories of consent to contract in different
areas of contract law.246 It challenges the wholly artificial hypothecation
of the intention of parties under an objective theory of consent.247 It
disputes the prevalence of freedom of contract as a propertied right, and
market efficiency as the determinative purpose in contracting. 248 It
accepts that well-functioning markets may be morally desirable 249 but
questions whether they ought necessarily to be protected through
244.

(2015).
245.
246.
247.
248.

See generally MICHAEL FURMSTON & GREGORY TOLHURST, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT

See supra Part II.
See supraPart III.
See supraPart V.
See supraPart IX.

249. See generally NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016).
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contract law. It evaluates the proposed nature and scope of such public
responsibilities, the criteria governing them, and their actual and
potential application to contracts in particular.250
Public responsibilities are necessary to fill lacunae in the so-called
private law not filled by the "new equity" that commenced in the midtwentieth century. 251 As such, responsibilities focus primarily, but not
exclusively, on the communal context in which contractual rights are
exercised. Using moral theory to identify the just society, the rationale
for public responsibilities is that social and economic rights, not limited
to property, are not absolute in nature, but are contingent on both private
and public interests which are unprotected by correlative rights giving
rise to correlative duties in contract.
The theory behind a public responsibility holds that a private right
is subject to a public good, as when an individual contractor is subject to
a public responsibility not to engage in contracts that discriminate on the
basis of race or sex, or that damage the environment to the harm of
future generations. Conversely, a government, including its courts, is
subject to a responsibility to regulate such discriminatory conduct in
respect of an individual employee or consumer. However, public
responsibilities transcend deficiencies in structural bargaining, focusing
also on material public interests that are unprotected by correlative
duties associated with reciprocal promises.
A public responsibility does not deny the conceptual principles
underlying deontological liberalism, as reflected in notions of the
individual's freedom to contract and the sanctity of contractual
promises.252 Nor does it refute the value of correlative rights and duties.
However, it does not conceive of these concepts as exhausting the
boundaries of contract law either conceptually or functionally.
In addition, applying a theory of public responsibility to contract
law does not purport to replace subjective consent with anthropomorphic
conceptions of the reasonable person when those objective measures are
artifacts that do not represent consent at all. 253 Nor, too, do public
responsibilities that supersede principles governing the formation,
performance, and termination of contracts signify the "death" of
contract, as the late Professor Grant Gilmore portended, either
250.

See supra PartVIII.

251.

Sir Alfred Denning, The Need for a New Equity, 5 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 5-6 (1952).

252.

G.C. Cheshire, A New Equitable Interest in Land, 16 MOD. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1953).

253. Cf Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, PersonalizingNegligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
627, 627 (2016) ("[W]ith the increasing availability of information about actors' characteristics,
negligence law should give up much of its objectivity by allowing courts to 'subjectify' the standard
of care-that is, to tailor it to the specific injurer's tendency to create risks and his or her ability to
reduce them.").
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conceptually or functionally.254 The purpose of public responsibilities is
also not to require the per se redistribution of rights as property or
wealth based on the per se need for social welfare.
However, public responsibilities do envisage placing limits on the
exercise of rights to redress social injustice, varying from the abuse of
contractual rights or powers, to the perpetuation of poverty and resulting
destitution and degradation, through the exercise of rights or powers in
contracting that are not addressed through correlative rights and duties
expressed through mutual promises.2 5' As such, so long as contract
rights are construed as property rights, and duties owed on account of
those rights are fettered, responsibilities are needed to redress the
imbalance between those interests-as imperfect or non-rights-and the
rights of producers, employers, and governments whose .rights are not so
fettered. 6 Such responsibilities are not limited to protection accorded to
consumers and employees in mass markets but also apply in legal areas
in which rights are underdeveloped such as in the protection of the
environment, or when legislatures fail to protect public interests due to
the political and economic costs of doing S0.257
In some respects, public responsibilities are defined by that which
they are not. They are not contingent on narrow conceptions of consent
to which correlative legal duties do not ordinarily attach. They are not
restricted to individuals but include corporate persons and governments
engaged in contracting. They are not determined formally, but
functionally; and they are not accounted for in the abstract, but
contextually. Nor do they rely on the simulated intention of parties who
have not expressed an intention or have done so doubtfully at best.
Viewed affirmatively, public responsibilities transcend restrictive
conceptions of reciprocal promises, fictionalized accounts of consent to
contract, and formalized depictions of privity of contract. They are
woven into the fabric of law, whether under the rubric of moral theory,
equitable dealings, or socially responsible contracting. What they have
lacked is a rationale that transcends the artificial boundaries between
private contracting and public responsibility for contracting. This Article
has sought to provide that rationale.

254. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974).
255. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The BargainPrincipleand Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741,
744 nn.7-8 (1982) (discussing how, inter alia, morality, beyond legal sanction, can justify enforcing
promises).
256. On the relationship between the bargain and the normative structure of a contract, see
STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 57-62 (2009) and Chamy, supra
note 154, at 1825-30. But cf Eisenberg, supra note 253, at 785-87.
257. See supra Parts III, IX.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss1/12

46

